It’s been awhile but the Cardinal is back. And he’s got some good advice for Spirit . . .
Spirit Airlines should be all over San Juan, PR (SJU), a leisure and VFR (visiting friends and relatives) market that has never been comprehensively attacked by a low-fare carrier. With American Airlines’ pull-down in SJU, both intra-Caribbean and mainland markets from SJU are ripe for such a carrier, and no airline is better positioned to do it than Spirit. In fact it’s kinda odd that Spirit’s not already in there, given some of the other weird stuff it’s attracted to instead.
Let’s take a step back
Spirit Airlines is one of the odder survivors in the industry. It’s been around for 30 years, but only in the past five-to-ten years has it really made that much of an impression. It started off in Detroit, flying clapped-out DC-9s and MD-80s. For a while it was run by a guy with a science doctorate, but those weren’t its best years.
Spirit hit the big time when private equity investors had the following brainwave after seeing the initial success of JetBlue – hey, why not make Spirit the next low-cost carrier (LCC) success? If David Neeleman can do this, how hard can it be? This resulted in several rounds of private equity investment to the ultimate tune of well over $200 million. Yeah, that’s a lot of fricking money to plow into a (at the time) small, crappy third-tier airline. Made the investors who threw money at Virgin America, Skybus and JetBlue look like models of sober propriety by comparison.
Turned out that in fact, it was a lot harder than the private equity investors expected. Spirit lost a ton of money (at one point, it apparently excused its flailing by blaming the MD-80 for its troubles – Spirit was in the process of getting A320 family aircraft. That alleged excuse looked pretty thin after Allegiant became the most profitable airline in the US flying, yes, MD-80s). Ultimately, a new private equity signed up in the form of Bill Franke’s Indigo, heavily diluting Oaktree, the original private equity.
Still, it was a near thing. Spirit damn near hit the wall in 2008, when it cashed in its remaining fuel hedges at the top of the fuel spike to get through a cash crunch. This was an incredibly gutsy move, essentially recognizing that if the fuel price run up was permanent, then Spirit was screwed anyway, so it might as well assume that it was temporary – taking the value of its hedges in cash, betting that fuel prices would go down – a bet it won. If only Southwest had had the same guts and cashed in its own, rather larger, fuel hedges at the same time, Southwest might not have gone through a deeply unpleasant experience later that year when it faced its own cash crunch.
Spirit’s ultimate success, after years of financial mediocrity or worse, has hinged on, essentially, two things:
- Introducing low-fare service to the Caribbean and the parts of Latin America that are closer to the US from its Ft Lauderdale (FLL) hub. This was the first time this geography has benefited from such service and Spirit deserves a lot of credit for that.
- Fairly aggressively mimicking Ryanair’s ultra-low cost carrier model. This is perhaps most evident in Spirit’s publicity strategy, where, like Ryanair, it scores free publicity by courting controversy – such as the notorious commercial featuring a young man sleeping with his best friend’s mother. But much of Spirit’s current business model is inspired by Ryanair, one way or another.
What is Spirit doing?
What’s somewhat unclear, however, is what Spirit’s longer-term network strategy might be. Some of its recent network moves make sense, others not so much.
One that makes sense is jumping onto Allegiant-style routes to FLL, especially those on which Allegiant is clearly coining money, such as Plattsburgh, NY (PBG – a gateway to Canada thanks to its proximity to Montreal). Not only can Spirit duplicate what Allegiant’s doing, it can also offer PBG customers a lot of interesting connections via FLL.
Some that make less sense are odd routes to Niagara Falls, NY and Latrobe, PA. These are close to the existing low-fare airports of Buffalo and Pittsburgh. For that reason, Spirit is not adding a lot of value to consumers in those areas. It generally makes more sense for a low-fare carrier to enter routes where there aren’t already a lot of low fares – which is what Allegiant does.
American’s disappearing San Juan hub
Which brings us to San Juan, PR (SJU). For 25 years, San Juan has been a hub for American Airlines, but American is basically throwing in the towel. The SJU hub dates back to a time when American saw itself as potentially offering all things to all people, but in the last 10 years especially, the SJU hub has been a leisure-centered anomaly in an airline that depends on higher-fare business traffic to survive.
American’s SJU hub basically collected folks from the US and connected them to all manner of Caribbean destinations. Inevitably, not many of these passengers were business travelers. It simply makes no sense for a high-cost legacy airline like American to do that. So, as the above graph shows, American is getting out (the graph shows weekly departing seats in July for the last 12 years – you get a similar decline if you look instead, at, say, January, so this decline is not restricted to just one season).
So hop to it, Spirit!
So who should be in this business? Why, an ultra-low cost carrier like Spirit. The leisure and VFR (visiting friends and relatives) business is incredibly elastic, as Spirit presumably already knows. Offer low fares and watch the number of passengers soar. There’s a little bit of low-fare service to San Juan at the moment, in the form of Spirit itself, AirTran and JetBlue on select routes to the US mainland. But no airline has ever gone after SJU in a comprehensive low-fare manner, and few markets are likely to surge quite as dramatically from the presence of a low-fare carrier.
Further, no airline has ever done any serious intra-Caribbean low-fare service. Barbados-based REDjet is supposed to be on the verge of starting such service, but so far nothing.
The Caribbean is a very interesting market to experiment with in this fashion. Existing fares are extremely high – American flew turboprops from SJU to many of the surrounding islands, but the fares were nosebleed high. Local players like Air Jamaica/Caribbean (now one and the same at a corporate level) and LIAT aren’t very strong, despite not particularly low fares. Further, many of the routes are quite short (which is good thing in an environment with increasing fuel prices, since fuel is a smaller component of the cost of short flights) yet there is, for obvious reasons, no viable competition from ground transport.
Further, no low-cost carrier has more experience in this part of the world than Spirit. They’ve already worked through many of the issues of serving markets where, for instance, web-commerce may be less developed.
So, the remaining question is, what’s Spirit waiting for, and why fool with the likes of Latrobe, PA, when there seems to be a big opportunity in SJU that appears tailor made for it? Hopefully, Spirit is simply waiting until Puerto Rico is desperate and is willing to cut them a good deal on airport costs…
The Cardinal is a long-time industry observer, who is currently [redacted]. He was previously a [redacted] at [redacted]. Prior to this he worked at [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted]. To his sorrow, he lives in [redacted] and in his spare time enjoys [redacted with extreme prejudice].