Three Big Airlines, Three Very Different Approaches to Long-Haul


I’ve had a lot of offline discussion about aircraft configuration and premium focus as of late, so I decided it was time to dive into the details to see just how things have changed at different airlines over the past decade. I unquestionably expected we’d see differences, but, well, I did not expect them to be as dramatic as they are. Each of the Big 3 US airlines has employed a very different strategy.

To have this discussion, I had to do some hard work. I pulled widebody fleet numbers today for American, Delta, and United and compared them to the numbers at the end of 2015. This wasn’t hard to do. What WAS hard was trying to figure out the configurations on each aircraft in 2015, so I could then do the math to figure out total seats that the airline had onboard. To be clear, this isn’t seats flown or any traditional metric. I’m just looking at the number of physical seats on each widebody. Where the airline flies them is something else entirely.

As I dug into this, I instantly regretted it. There are some fleets that are exceedingly difficult to figure out. But I didn’t give up and I think I got close enough. So, let me give a couple caveats before we get to the fun stuff.

  • Again, these are widebodies only. I realize that the airlines all used B757s for longer haul flying to some extent, but I just couldn’t figure out a good way to look at those fleets. So, widebodies it is.
  • The only widebodies I pulled out of the equation are the United domestic B777s and a handful of domestic-configured Delta B767s from 2015 since those only fly/flew within the US/short-haul.
  • American was in the middle of a 777 transition in 2015. I believe the plan was to have 13 B777-200ERs with 45 business class seats and the rest with 37. If that’s wrong, well, it could change the math a little, but those are the numbers I used.
  • American’s B767s were shown in their final configuration. I believe the conversion had been done by then, but if there were some stragglers, then so be it.
  • Delta’s B767s are impossible to track going back to 2015. I believe most (28) were in the 76Z configuration with 26 biz and 200 coach back then, but there were some in the 76L (9?) and 76T (5?) configurations with 36 business class seats. That may not be perfectly right. Today, there are still 2 in the 76Z configuration and 7 as 76Ls, but 30 airplanes are in the new 76K config with premium economy.
  • Delta’s first 19 A350s have 32 business class seats, but another 19 new deliveries and aircraft from LATAM that are being reconfigured have 40.
  • United’s B777-200ERs had separate Continental and United configurations still in 2015, so I have used those numbers pre-Polaris with 50 and 48 in biz respectively.
  • I’ve split United’s B767-300ERs into the 46 biz (24 aircraft) and 30 biz (13 aircraft) configurations currently, and that should be accurate.

Enough caveats, right? Meh, you probably ignored that and skipped ahead anyway, but I wanted you to understand the depths of my pain. Anyway, let’s get on with it.

Physical Widebody Seats By Cabin 2025 vs 2015

I told you it was a lot different by airline, didn’t I? Yes, they all introduced premium economy during that 10 year period, but other than that, they didn’t have much in common. Let’s go through it.

American is Actually Shrinking

I have checked and double-checked this data multiple times and run it by others. Sure enough, American has been a shrinking airline. It saw total widebody seats drop from around 38,800 to just over 35,300. How can this happen? It’s pretty simple… thank leadership decisions during the pandemic.

American saw the pandemic as an opportunity to simplify its fleet, so it made a sweeping decision to permanently retire the airline’s 15 A330-200s, 9 A330-300s, and 45 B767-300ERs. Now to be clear, I should note that there were 45 B767s in 2015. There were only 17 left at the end of 2019.

In its place, American did take two more B777-300ERs, but it was really the B787 that had to do all the heavy lifting. In 2015, American had 15 B787-8s, and now it has 37 of them with another 28 B787-9s.

When American rolled out premium economy, it shrunk the front cabins even more, now giving the B787-8s a mere 20 seats in business. That might have made sense before (maybe), but it certainly doesn’t make any sense today. The airline has a lot of B787-8s, a small airplane that’s hard to configure premium-heavy without really cutting into coach.

The end result? American’s widebody seats have shrunk, but the percent of seats in the business cabin has also gone down a smidge from 13.5 percent to 13.2 percent. Perhaps it’s not fair to say that in itself is crazy, because it did introduce premium economy which is now 9.6 percent of the fleet. If that is pulling from business and not coach as you’d hope, then maybe a smaller business class made sense in someone’s mind.

It does not make sense now.

Delta Grows But Business Shrinks

Delta has gone in a different direction that American. Total widebody seats climbed from just shy of 33,000 to more than 46,000. Where did this come from? It’s pretty simple, actually. The 18-strong B777 and dwindling 9-strong B747 fleets were retired but the entire 37 A330-900neo and 38 A350-900 fleets were built from nothing.

Surprisingly, the B767-300ER international fleet has stayed pretty flat. All the domestic ones were retired before the pandemic, but those have been pulled out of the calculation in 2015 anyway. Today, most of the B767-300ERs have been converted to the new configuration with premium economy onboard. There are still seven that have no premium economy but have more business class seats instead. Those tend to do a lot of San Francisco – New York/JFK and Atlanta flying along with JFK to Prague. And somehow there are still two airplanes in the old configuration from before premium economy existed.

So why did the percentage of seats in the business cabin on Delta go down in the last 10 years? It really comes down to how the airline decided to outfit its A330-900neos and A350-900s. Both of those have lower percentages than the rest of the fleet, so it brought the count down. Just consider this. The A330-200 has more business class seats at 34 than the original A350-900 has at 32.

Delta is working on updating this with the new configuration on its A350s with 40 business class seats, so the percentage will rise again.

United Goes All In

And that brings us to United which has absolutely gone wild with its widebody fleet. In 2015, United had the fewest widebody seats in aggregate at just shy of 27,000 but it is now an easy number one at more than 53,000. It had the highest percentage of business class seats at 17.6 percent, and remarkably, even after adding premium economy, that has stayed relatively flat.

At United, the airline’s B787-8 and B787-10 fleets are the stingiest. But those aren’t huge fleets at 12 and 21 respectively. There are 45 B787-9s alone, not to mention all the other airplanes.

We also can’t forget what United has done with its B767-300ERs to create the London chariot. This subset of 24 airplanes now has 46 beds which is more than a quarter of the entire airplane. Those did not exist back in 2015.

What I do find interesting, however, is that this strategy of a higher premium cabin count doesn’t seem new. The B747 was over 17 percent. Even the original B787-8 configuration was over 16 percent before they started adding premium economy to the aircraft.


I have no doubt that American would have more seats if Boeing had been able to deliver aircraft on time, but ultimately, the airline has decided it seems fine falling so far behind. That tracks. Meanwhile, it looks like Delta overdid on premium economy and cut back the beds too much. It’s working to fix that now. United, however, just keeps growing like a weed and trying to surf that premium wave for as long as it can. So far, it’s Delta and United that are turning in the best financial results.

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Brett Avatar

17 responses to “Three Big Airlines, Three Very Different Approaches to Long-Haul”

  1. Kilroy Avatar
    Kilroy

    When 767s come up these days or when I see them on flight schedules, I’m always surprised that they are still around, and still economical to fly (though the fact that they are probably fully depreciated helps, as does the fact some are used on lower hours/day utlization routes, like from the US deep South America)… Some quick checks on the average age of the airlines’ 767 fleets suggests that many of the planes currently flown by US airlines are pushing the 30 year old mark, and the youngest are almost old enough to vote.

    This is probably more of a mental thing with me (shows my age), and I know that the 767s are in the process of being phased out, but I just remember the 767 as a “90s plane”, having flown it in the 90s and early 2000s. Not being critical (I don’t really have strong feelings one way or the other towards the 767, though I prefer the 757), just nostalgia.

    It will be interesting to see how long the 767 passenger planes live on in the cargo world.

    1. JT8D Avatar
      JT8D

      The 767 was designed in the 1970s, so it’s 50 year old tech, even if there have been upgrades along the way.

      It was designed as a US domestic aircraft, believe it or not (the US industry was regulated thru 1978, and widebodies flew to a lot of places that you’d never see them today. I believe Eastern even brought the L1011 to Syracuse). Widebodies flew from the Northeast to Florida, for instance.

      There was no ETOPS when the 767 was designed and therefore it was not a transatlantic aircraft until ETOPS was developed, motivated by the existence of the 767. In other words, when the 767 was designed, there was no such thing as twin engine aircraft flying across the Atlantic.

      1. JB14-Hrbek Avatar
        JB14-Hrbek

        The 2-3-2 layout in Y for the 767s is the best. 3-3-3 sucks, especially for families of 4 traveling together. 2-4-2 isn’t bad, either, like the A330/340s have.

  2. Angetenar Avatar
    Angetenar

    Hi Brett, thanks for the article. I’ve seen UA management claim in the past that they had more lie flat seats than DL and AA combined. Can you corroborate this claim? I think I tried to do the math once but I couldn’t find the breakdown on 32 J vs 40 J for DL A350s so I didn’t come to a conclusion.

    1. Wany Avatar
      Wany

      I think those 757 may be doing a lot of work here. I understand why Brett excluded 757. All three had a lot of 757s back in 2015. pmUS 757 did not have beds. Not sure about pmAA 757s. Today, DL has 15 out of 100+ 757s with beds. In UA 757 fleet, 40 out of 55 have beds. Both are equipped with16 beds. UA has 160 in the back vs 152 in DL. So percentage wise, DL has a little edge here.

      1. SEA-SFO Avatar
        SEA-SFO

        I feel like this is part of the story. All of the 40 pre-merger Continental 757s were outfitted with flatbeds and their transatlantic use was a lot more than just long, thin routes. Even major trunk routes like EWR-AMS and several EWR-LHR frequencies saw them (Patrick Quayle talked about how this was uncompetitive and causing them to lose business on a podcast episode a while ago).

        A lot of that has since been switched to either the high-J 767s or 777-200ERs/787-10s depending on the market/season, so that would still represent a large increase in both economy and business seats today versus the early-mid 2010s.

    2. JT8D Avatar
      JT8D

      Seems not out of the question. Stack the green bars for AA and DL for 2025 – they seem about the same size as the green bar for UA. It’s not the full answer, but you can see that it’s at least possible.

    3. Brett Avatar

      Angetenar – Well, it’s close. According to this, United has 9,328 beds while American and Delta have 10,312 combined. Add in the domestic 777s for United and the B757s and it comes up to 10,612. But then you have to add back the American A321Ts and the Delta 757s which brings them to 11,032.

      So, maybe not exactly true but it’s pretty damn close.

  3. tb Avatar
    tb

    “…but ultimately, the airline has decided it seems fine falling so far behind. That tracks.”

    What a damning indictment of what AA has become, and 100% on the mark. You wonder how an airline performing (and reacting) in this way has any sort of story to tell investors. If I want to put my money in an airline (questionable to begin with, I know) why would I give any capital to an outfit that simply seems to be fine with being mediocre? As the margin gap continues to climb between DL/UA and the rest, is AA destined to be the Greyhound of domestic travel, while those looking for premium service and international utility use DL or UA?

    1. emac Avatar
      emac

      I think there’s a possible, *kinda* defense of American here.

      Pre-pandemic, domestic was all the rage. Delta and Southwest were riding high on their domestic strength, United’s strategy was all about building domestic connections and increasing domestic gauge.

      Post-pandemic, for whatever combination of reasons, domestic is a dog and international premium is the star. (Reasons: over-capacity, traveler trends and preferences, relatively less competition internationally, etc. — would be fun to see an analysis of this!)

      United made the right bet, American made the wrong bet. The future wasn’t in the back of a dark plane to El Paso, it was in the nice seats heading to Rome, Athens, Tahiti, Oceana, South Africa and so on. (Also, “future” could end at any time.)

      1. See_Bee Avatar
        See_Bee

        To me, this comes down to knowing your customer, or perhaps framed differently, who you define as your customer

        DL was very clear in their pre-COVID investor decks that they wanted to continue to target their high-value customers (i.e. road warriors) and emerging high-value customers (aka affluent millennials & Gen-X coming into their peak earning years, along with the coming Gen Z) and knew those customers want to earn & burn and prioritize experiences (i.e. international travel). They made decisions during COVID accordingly. UA quickly took a similar POV

        IMO, AA was hyper-focused on their “schedule” and competing with the LCCs of the world. They took a stance that airlines were still a largely commoditized product and doubled-down accordingly

      2. tb Avatar
        tb

        emac definitely a case of “wrong move at the wrong time” for AA. But in a larger context, this is where the three carriers were headed anyway pre-Covid. Knowing how cyclical the industry is, why an airline would permanently park widebodies with no opportunity for return is just a head scratcher. The answer is their debt load. They simply couldn’t pass up an opportunity to offload those 330’s and 767’s due to the balance sheet. But for me this is just one in a long line of questionable decisions coming out of the Skyview campus. They continue to run the airline like it’s early-2000’s Cactus, not one of the premier brands and assets in the entire world. I mean they literally have “American” on the side of the plane but persist in managing it like a Dollar General.

        (Full disclosure, I started my career at Bob Crandall’s AA in the mid-90’s. So I may be a touch biased in my outlook LOL)

  4. Carl Avatar
    Carl

    This nicely sums up why, if you are going to fly a US carrier long haul, United is the best choice. When you are flexible there is solid inventory of business lie flat beds which means an opportunity to purchase discounted business class or upgrade on the less popular travel days, and solid inventory at good fares on the premium days. Whatever you think of UAs service and soft product, the lie flat bed is solid and consistent throughout the fleet. Delta and AA fall short there.

  5. southbay flier Avatar
    southbay flier

    It’s another sign about how poorly United was managed until Scott Kirby came over from AA.

    1. LovetoFly Avatar
      LovetoFly

      I don’t think that’s a correct assessment. The United we see today under Kirby is thank in no small part to the work Oscar Munoz did with employees regaining their trust, boosting morale, increasing pay among other things. United was 100% mismanaged prior to Munoz’s arrival. The United we see and enjoy today would not exist if not for the hard work of Oscar Munoz and his team when he was at United. Even though employee morale isn’t at the same high as was seen during the Munoz era Kirby has managed to hold on to some of that employee enthusiasm and morale while focusing on United operations.

      United’s turnaround really began with the Board understanding United would never live up to its full potential without first addressing employee morale which is where Munoz came in. If United would have gone from Tilton, to Smisek, to Kirby we would be looking at a different United Airlines today than what we have. United absolutely needed Munoz slotted in-between Smisek and Kirby.

      1. abcdefg Avatar
        abcdefg

        That feels fair. Munoz fixed the culture, which allowed Kirby to fix the strategy and then execute like crazy on it.

  6. Kitsune4px Avatar
    Kitsune4px

    Brett as a side note, I saw your comment on Bluesky about AA pilots complaint regarding scope clause and AA code share on future AS international flights. I think this analysis shows why they might be really bothered by AS filling a gap in AA international capacity, less wide bodies means less opportunities to upgrade into the better paying international trips. I had a good friend who started out with PS back in the 80s, ended up flying 767/757 international out of PHL for US, he commuted transcon for the better part of 20 years, because even after the US/AA merger he would have had to give up his good paying, regular international seat to change domiciles out of PHL because of all the adventures in seniority list merging.

    Having looked more carefully at the full scope part of the AA contract, I do think the AA pilots might have a leg to stand on; the language is very vague. AS and HA are covered under “Domestic Carriers” and only call-out is for domestic flying. (I’m not convinced that legally “domestic carrier” and “US registered carrier” are the interchangeable terms in this context) The scope clause has a general statement up front that flying is by AA pilots except as described in the rest of the section; you can argue that by default international flying is fenced from being done by AS or HA because it’s not called out in the separate international section of the scope clause. Not saying that’s the correct interpretation; I’m sure management is going to say AS flights are allowed and “domestic carriers” should be interpreted as US based airlines, not the domestic market. In the end this will require an arbitrator/judge to decide an official interpretation. But either way I don’t think it’s quite as clear cut as you seemed to indicate in your Bluesky comment.

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