American’s Rapid Journey to Dominance in the 1980s (Part 1)


If you hated the 1980s, then I have bad news for you. This new SkyGo tool I’m using has me diving deep into the weeds during that decade. Today, I want to do an ’80s review of the powerhouse that is (ahem, was) American Airlines. This is actually a two-parter, and today I’m going to start with what American did to strengthen its legacy positions. Next time we’ll talk about how the airline made strategic moves to grow.

The ’80s were a time of chaos. Deregulation had just gone into effect in 1978, and so it was all settling out in the 1980s. The industry that existed in 1980 was far more fragmented and messy than what was there in 1990. But through it all, American was the rock star. Sure, United had its moments, USAir came into its own, and Delta got bigger, but there was no airline that moved quite the way American did to secure positions and carve out domains during that decade. Today, thanks to Claude helping me with the visualizations, I want to take a journey through the evolution of American’s main stations in that era.

The charts you’ll see in the next two days are all laid out the same. The lines show the number of departures by airline while the dots are sized depending upon the number of destinations served by that airline from that location. Now, let’s do this.

Long, long ago… American was primarily a northeast to southwest airline. Its historical positions in both New York and Los Angeles are well-known, so why don’t we start there? In both these legacy hubs, American made moves, but these aren’t places where American needed to have a laser-like focus. It just needed to find ways to maintain and bolster its positions.

New York City (JFK + LaGuardia) by Airline (1980-1990)

OAG schedule data via SkyGo

Yes, this leaves out the PeoplExpress phenomenon over at Newark, but it can be (and has been) argued that these aren’t exactly the same markets. American’s focus was on this side of the Hudson.

Going into 1980, American had an enviable position that was behind only Eastern, but as the 1980s went on and American’s gaze strayed, it fell off. The competition was from the old guard with Eastern and TWA along with the newly-christened USAir. Pan Am made big moves, especially after acquiring National. And of course there was little New York Air which added some capacity at the bottom. But by the middle of the decade, American was done playing nice.

The airline bulked up. Eastern — deep in the death throes by the back half of the decade — fell off dramatically. USAir also made a run at the end of the decade, and it kept that position until the slot swap with Delta for Washington/National flying many years later. By 1990, American had regained its position, but it was now second only to Pan Am, an airline which would fail soon after. Of course, Delta picked that up and ran with it, but in 1990, American was well-positioned in New York.

LAX by Airline (1980-1990)

OAG schedule data via SkyGo

We’ve talked about LAX a lot lately, but in 1980, American was small compared to United, Western, and PSA. (And yes, Golden Gate West had a lot of departures but on tiny airplanes.) American was still very relevant and important because of its position in the high dollar markets like New York, but it let its overall position sag until the middle of the decade.

This market had a significant number of regional flights on independent airlines, but those airlines by the middle of the decade began to line up with bigger airlines to use their codes. And that is when we see a real realignment. For American, that meant bringing Wings West into the fold while Western (and then Delta) had SkyWest.

This was also a time for big mergers. Delta bought Western, USAir took out PSA, and American acquired AirCal. By the end of the decade, American was bigger and in the mix for the top spot. Delta was in the lead after that Western acquisition, but American and United were neck and neck for a close second place, much better than in 1980.

NYC and LAX were very busy markets that saw things shake out rapidly. American did not lose ground in the end, but these two markets were already falling behind American’s new and surging mid-continent hubs. Chicago/O’Hare and Dallas/Fort Worth were American’s #1 and #2 respectively. Let’s look at those.


Chicago/O’Hare by Airline (1980-1990)

OAG schedule data via SkyGo

Chicago may have been American’s biggest market, but United was still Chicago’s biggest airline in 1980. Many, many others were still relevant in the market, including Northwest, Republic, Delta, and TWA.

Early in the 1980s, United grew fast, and American tried to keep up but it fell behind. Meanwhile, everyone else abandoned the effort, realizing it was not worth it. Even a combined Northwest and Republic had less than even one of those airlines had on its own by the end of the decade. Delta dropped off, TWA went low, and only Continental made a brief rise when it was merged with PeopleExpress, New York Air, and Frontier in the late 1980s. That was short-lived.

By the end of the decade, American decided it needed to put the pedal to the metal. With a growing fleet of MD-80s, it had the right airplane to challenge United, and the airlines were in a virtual dead heat by the time 1990 rolled around.

Dallas/Fort Worth by Airline (1980-1990)

OAG schedule data via SkyGo

Today we think of DFW as American’s fortress, but it was far from that in 1980. In fact, American was smaller than Braniff, and Braniff was growing like a weed after deregulation. Of course, it was that chaotic growth that led to Braniff’s failure in 1982. It tried to come back to life as Braniff II, but it was never the same and just petered out, no longer a real threat.

Instead, when Braniff failed, it was Delta that saw the opportunity, and so it tried to match American’s torrid growth. Texas International had a similar-sized presence to Delta, but it quickly walked away, something that accelerated when it was merged into Continental in 1982.

By 1990, Delta had a real hub, but it was a far cry from what American had built. We all know in the end that Delta gave up, but at the time, American took this threat seriously and never hesitated.


These four markets made up four of American’s nine most important in 1990, but the other five were created almost out of thin air. I’ll talk about those next time.

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Brett Avatar

76 responses to “American’s Rapid Journey to Dominance in the 1980s (Part 1)”

  1. Dave at LEX Avatar
    Dave at LEX

    Nowhere does my color-blindness impact my life more than in trying to read Cranky charts/graphs.

    1. Outer Space Guy Avatar
      Outer Space Guy

      Even for someone who is NOT colorblind, those bubbles+labels are nearly impossible to read. Especially when there are many airlines and the colors are close. Please at the very least put each label on the start or end of the first or last datapoint itself. Please also use very distinctly different colors and shapes (make one row “filled bubbles” as filled squares, another row as filled in triangles, another row as striped bubbles, etc). Please give us as many different ways of easily understanding the story you are trying to tell.

      Thanks

      1. Joe Avatar
        Joe

        I’m not color blind but 10 colors in one graph is just too many (especially without any labels). It would have been better to just use a simple data table than these graphs. Also without scale for the circle sizes so we can at least see the range of destinations served. Nevertheless (outside of the largest and smallest) it is still be hard to decern the nuance of size gradients of the circles.

    2. Brett Avatar

      Added some labels in the charts to make it easier to read. Some of these won’t be easy at all thanks to the number of lines, but there’s only so much I can do

      1. Eric R Avatar
        Eric R

        MUCH better with the labels. Thank you!

      2. PJ Avatar
        PJ

        Thank you for the labels! I read this earlier and couldn’t follow those graphs at all. The labels make a world of difference.

        Looking forward to Part 2 tomorrow.

      3. CraigTPA Avatar
        CraigTPA

        The labels definitely make it much easier to read, thanks!

      4. Outer Space Guy Avatar
        Outer Space Guy

        much better with the revised charts!

  2. Grichard Avatar
    Grichard

    I like today’s graphs, myself. Adding another data set with the symbol sizes is effective.

    Brett, I *strongly* recommend picking up a book called “The Visual Display of Quantitative Information” by Edward Tufte if you’re not already familiar with it.

    It’s the definitive book on how to make good graphs. It’s also entertaining. It’s not a reference book; it’s something to enjoy reading.

    1. Brad Avatar
      Brad

      I doubt that he is still teaching the class on data visualization, but it was wonderful and incredibly helpful! One of the best professional classes that I ever attended during my career.

      Also got all three of his books for going to the class.

      Just went and looked (quickly!) he has an online course that is available and he now has 5 books! Highly recommended material.

  3. Angry Bob Crandall Avatar
    Angry Bob Crandall

    Cranky,
    What about Hughes Airwest / Republic Airlines at LAX?

    1. Matt D Avatar
      Matt D

      Going from memory of course, but I don’t think that RW/RC were ever all that significant at LAX. I think the peak was around 15, maybe 20 flights a day, give or take. LAX was never more than a spoke for them. I think their strengths (so much as they had them) were PHX, LAS, and maybe SFO.

      Republic pruned off most of the intra-west routes fairly quickly. Compare their route maps in 1980 versus 1985 and you wouldn’t even think they were the same airline.

      1. Eric R Avatar
        Eric R

        Interestingly enough, Airwest/Republic was not known for their PHX-LAX route. In fact, I don’t think they ever flew that route, and if they did it was very short lived. They did fly quite a bit from PHX to SNA/BUR/ONT.

        The big PHX-LAX airlines during the 1980’s were United/PSA/Western/Southwest/AmericaWest. It was a very saturated market pair during the 1980’s and into the 1990’s with Southwest and AmericaWest running a crazy amount of frequencies between these two airports.

    2. Brett Avatar

      Angry Bob – They were about the same size as Delta before the Western acquisition. Never changed much, and weren’t overly important so I left that one out.

  4. Matt D Avatar
    Matt D

    Hey. I grew up in the 80’s. I wasn’t a fan of getting bullied in school almost every day (which finally stopped once I became six feet tall and learned to punch back).

    A lot of that decade was great. But some things are also best left in the past. Rap/Hip-Hop music took off in around 1987 or so. The quality of most popular music also nosedived around the same time. And “Puttin’ On The Ritz” by Taco is the single worst song ever. All copies of that song in existence should be burned. Far worse than anything ABBA or Whitney Houston ever put out.

    But this is a site and write-up about the airlines, so I’ll get back to that. So much you brought up. I became a fan of planes in Fall of 1983. I remember the one thing that sparked my interest: when my dad took me to an airshow they had at ONT. Got to walk around and through an AirCal 737-200, a Federal Express 727, and a USAF KC-10. Those are the three I remember them having on static display.

    I immediately took a love to watching and learning. I’d get my dad to take me to the airport, where I’d raid the ticket counters. And I’d pore over the timetables, learning the schedules, flight times, types, and of course history. Read every magazine and airplane book I could find. It was a passion that continued for many years…..

    Anyway, I’ve already droned on long enough. I told you I love it when you write the history essays. Those, I can really sink my tooth into.

    A couple of things and then I’ll stop. Otherwise, I could be writing all day and I have stuff to do.

    You know that New York Air was a part of Continental, right? They were probably the first airline-within-an-airline concept. So they should really be counted as one and the same.

    And speaking of American and CO, legend has it (I have not confirmed this) that the only…..only reason American ever bought AirCal was because Lorenzo and Crandall were locked into a d*ck swinging, pissing match contest and the latter wanted to one-up the former. I guess Frankie, being on the crusaded quest that he was, had his eyes on AirCal. And Bobby decided to jump the gun and snatch them before his nemesis could make up his mind.

    It was a classic case of “I don’t want it, I don’t need it. But I’m going to get it before he does.”

    But it wasn’t totally in vain. It definitely got AA a firm hold into SNA and SJC. That paid off for a long time after, even though by 1991, as with USAir and PSA, there was almost nothing else left of what they bought.

    As I said in another recent post, the Recession of 1990-1991 absolutely hammered everyone.

    Ok…I’m done for now.

    1. Brett Avatar

      Matt D – New York Air wasn’t part of Continental. It was another subsidiary of Texas Air Corporation which was merged into Continental in 1987.

      1. Southside Emil Avatar
        Southside Emil

        Cranky,

        Di you consider Continental West to be a part of Continental in your graphs?

        1. Brett Avatar

          Southside – Oh you know, good point. That must be the spike from Continental in the graph. I believe Continental West used the CO code so it would be included.

      2. Matt D Avatar
        Matt D

        My memory of the lineage and series of events is, as I’ve said, a little hazy.

        But I could’ve sworn that the whole reason for setting up New York Air in the first place was to be a non Union airline. And also to circumvent some of the terms of the 1982 CO BK filing; this was why NYA had MD-80’s and 737-300’s in service at the same time. The 733’s were ordered by and intended for CO. But it was a few years before they were actually able to take them. NYA, for all intents and purposes, acted as a placeholder for those planes until the BK was settled and they were allowed to receive and operate them.

        It might’ve been a Texas Air subsidiary, but in the end, all eventually ended up under the CO brand. I just might not have the sequence down correctly. So the sentiment in my earlier reply is still generally correct even if not 100% correct.

        1. Brett Avatar

          Matt D – Yeah, everything Lorenzo did was to circumvent existing costs in one way or another. But New York Air was a separate airline with its own NY code. I think the MD-80s were there at the start and then the 733s got diverted there when they started arriving a few years later. It’s really hard to follow what he did, especially when he started moving assets out of Eastern to get lower costs.

        2. JT8D Avatar
          JT8D

          The CO bankruptcy filing was 1983. New York Air was in fact founded to be a non-union subsidiary. It was not a Continental subsidiary, it was a Texas Air subsidiary so it was a sibling to Continental (actually to Texas International, because Texas Air did not own Continental when New York Air was founded). This was one of the reasons pilots were against Lorenzo, even before the 1983 bankruptcy.

          Yes, Texas Air directed aircraft to whatever subsidiary could take them. CO was unable to take such aircraft until it re-emerged from Ch 11, it’s why Continental West was founded, which flew such aircraft under the CO name until CO re-emerged, at which time Continental West was folded back into Continental.

          The CO bankruptcy was September 1983. The Braniff bankruptcy was May 1982 – only 16 months before.

          At the time of the Braniff bankruptcy, the conventional wisdom was that a major airline could not operate in bankruptcy. Other airlines had operated in bankruptcy (and emerged) before, but generally they were smaller carriers. Lorenzo, because he had no option and was not willing to say die, challenged that in 1983 and the airline world has not been the same since.

          A giant what-if is what if Braniff had done in 1982 what Continental did in 1983. Of course, the Braniff bankruptcy of 1982 in some ways enabled CO’s ability to fly out of bankruptcy in 1983, by putting a huge surplus of pilots on the market.

          But that time period between May 1982 and Sept 1983 – that right there is a huge change in how US airlines worked. Braniff fails, Continental succeeds.

          1. Dale Avatar
            Dale

            I remember Frank Lorenzo was the first or at least one of the first to use bankruptcy to tear up existing labour contracts and force employees to accept lower pay. That was a source of major unhappiness among rank and file employees.

          2. Iowa Airspace Avatar
            Iowa Airspace

            Great stuff JT8D–reading through the threaded comments before yours I was thinking “wasn’t NYA founded with Texas Air planes but without Texas Air crews?” somewhat tenuously, so appreciate coming to your comment right at that moment and having my inkling confirmed. I read Frank’s book last year (and many other books that discuss this time frame, like Hard Landing, over the years) but those details can be hazy rattling around over the past three decades. What I did not know was all that about Continental West, which is super interesting too and I don’t recall hearing about it in other places.

            It’s interesting to consider a flying Braniff bankruptcy. I know from John Nance’s book on Braniff that Howard Putnam’s primary concern was having all the aircraft be repossessed by creditors at outstations after they filed, which is why they did their best to get as many Flying Color jets back at DFW as possible before filing at midnight. I believe thats the book that claims the captain of the Great Pumpkin 747 flying passengers on the return HNL-DFW leg used his own personal credit card for gas, but I’m dubious.

    2. 1990 Avatar
      1990

      Other than de-regulation, I would think all the smoking on planes (and restaurants, offices, basically everywhere) would have been the most distinct difference between aviation (as a passenger) between the 1980s and 1990s (and beyond). But, sure, music and culture was slightly different, too…

      1. SEAN Avatar
        SEAN

        “I want one ticket to Chicago, no baggage. Smoking or non-smoking? Smoking please… there you are puff of smoke appears.”

        1. 1990 Avatar
          1990

          “Looks like I picked the wrong week to quit smoking…”

          1. Bill from DC Avatar
            Bill from DC

            And amphetamines…

            1. Matt D Avatar
              Matt D

              Or sniffing glue.

              Hey has anyone seen my horse?

      2. JT8D Avatar
        JT8D

        At the beginning of the 1980s there was no yield management, there were no frequent flyer programs and hubs-and-spokes were basically hardly developed.J

    3. Mike B Avatar
      Mike B

      Matt D – thank you for brining back early airport memories! Mine were from SAN/SNA/LAX, but like you, I raided the ticket counters (bonus if the timetable had a route map) and had a family friend who was a travel agent who gave me her old OAGs….I read those like a novel :). Cheers to this lifelong hobby and passion!

    4. Joe Wolf Avatar
      Joe Wolf

      There’s one HUGE factual error in your comment, Matt D: the all time worst song wasn’t recorded by Taco. It was “Could’ve Been”, by Tiffany. I’d rather listen to an hour long recording of a cat trying to cough up a hairball than listen to this song….because cats are less screechy than Tiffany is.

  5. Gary Smedile Avatar
    Gary Smedile

    Good statistical analysis. But you’ve left out some of the “why’s” and “how’s.” Key to AA growth were two things: a B scale wage for new hires and outlying (spoke) airports (including cross utilization of employees: ramp to ticket counter and back, etc). And the dawn of aircraft leasing. AA made a great deal to lease a slug of MD80’s which gave them a financially advantageous tool to grow and grow rapidly.
    Also, don’t overlook that up until Icahn, TWA was the number one transcon carrier: JFK to LAX and SFO. And #1 carrier in JFK and transatlantic. AA strength in NY was underpinned mightily by the hourly LGA flights to BOS and DCA.
    And then there was Bob Crandall. Passed over for TW leadership, he left and once his non-compete interlude had ended, landed at AA and went all out to build AA into the “take no prisoners “ powerhouse that it became. Legendary leadership. Quite different from TWA in the same era. Then came Ic#hn who decimated and destroyed and who has a reserved spot in hell.
    Anxious to read your Part 2

    1. Eric R Avatar
      Eric R

      Great adds. Completely forgot about the B scale wages and the deal they got on those MD80’s.

    2. Brett Avatar

      Gary – I haven’t left it out! I just talk about it tomorrow when I summarize everything. I do mention the B-scale and the MD-80s in that.

      1. Gary Smedle Avatar
        Gary Smedle

        good deal, Brett. I did end my post with “anxious to read your Part 2.” still anxious, even if I was an unwitting spoiler.

    3. Jason Avatar
      Jason

      AA did not have hourly flights in the 1980s between NY and BOS/DCA. That was firmly Eastern Shuttle, and eventually Pan Am Shuttle. AA did have frequent service to Chicago and Dallas, though.

      1. Gary Smedle Avatar
        Gary Smedle

        correct. AA had hourly to/from ORD and a substantial schedule to DFW and DTW plus a few cats and dogs (notably LAX). “shuttle” came later.

  6. Tim Dunn Avatar
    Tim Dunn

    The early deregulation years left all of the airlines trying to figure out how to survive. Some airlines decided to walk away from traditional hubs to build others while some carriers became stronger in some hubs through organic growth but most size shift came through the failure of other carriers and mergers.

    The “decade” of the 80s ended with the Gulf wars which forced several carriers out of business and allowed the legacies to pick up new assets.

    The same cycle repeated in the 90s, 2000s, and later with terrorism, macroeconomic events and disease.

    The bottom line is that AA survived all of that and continued to grow even with its HDQ move from NYC to Texas and organic development of the DFW hub (one of the smarter moves of the deregulated era) but lost the plot and quit winning halfway through the deregulated era and after 9/11.

    it is always good to look back at history but also said to see what AA had and has been able to build on -and even lose, even if they have gained elsewhere.

    1. Matt D Avatar
      Matt D

      To be fair, the end of the ’80s and start of the 90’s just finished off jobs that were started many years earlier. Like Pan Am. Its demise can arguably be reverse engineered all the way back to around 1970 and how they leveraged themselves to the hilt launching the 747 program. Then there was the National disaster.

      The fall of Eastern can probably be traced back to around 1982, give or take and Borman. That appears to have been about when the labor turmoil started. They never recovered from that and it ultimately finished them off.

      One of Easterns earliest 757 routes was ATL-ONT. THAT was a treat to see when it arrived in the mid/late afternoon.

      (as an aside it can probably be argued that in many ways, JetBlue is a sort of contemporary reincarnate of Eastern and National to a lesser extent as far as route system)

      PSA probably wouldn’t have lasted much longer had USAir not bought them. They were already a very sick airline by 1987. That goes back to using 727s on intra-CA when that was far too big and heavy of a plane for those routes. They didn’t learn the lesson that their protogé, Southwest did: the 737 would’ve been a far better choice. And then they bought MD-80’s AND BAe-146’s. One of the biggest “what were they thinking” questions of all time in the annals of airline history.

      Had they continued flying, I highly doubt they would’ve made it alive past 1991. Because of both how weak they were and the Recession of that year. And they would’ve been a 4th major casualty of that year.

      TWA and Northwest *almost* didn’t make it. I had an aunt (now deceased) who was a travel agent. And so she’d bring me her industry magazines because she knew I loved to read the airline ads and stories. And I remember reading that both of those airlines were placed on “death watch” notice in the Summer of 1992. I don’t believe that announcement was ever made to the mainstream press. But the industry was advised against using both airlines that year.

      There were also a few proposed mergers that ultimately fell through. TWA/Western had talks. There was talk of Pan Am and Northwest getting hitched. United and the original Frontier did some dancing.

      Interesting times, for sure. After all that turmoil, no wonder that most of the 1990’s were so serene and thus, mostly forgotten. And that was *my* “coming of age” era.

      1. Dan GOLDZBAND Avatar
        Dan GOLDZBAND

        Matt, interesting comments re PSA (I am a life-long fan). The BAE was a very badly-thought out decision, especially considering the failure to measure the interior (and realize it would not accomodate 6-abreast seating) but PSA had retired its 727’s by 1985, so their inferior ecnomics were no longer a factor. The 90-91 recession certainly would have made life difficult for the airline, but ultimately its leadership was the reason it did not prevail. That CEO was seriously disturbed, and the first Pres., Andrews, while universally loved did nothing to institutionalize the cultural factors that were the backbone of the airline’s strength.

        A good airline and bad company.

        1. Matt D Avatar
          Matt D

          Perhaps. But by the time the last 727 left the property, the damage was already done. So the retirement of that plane probably had no effect on their fate, especially since the hole that was dug with the 727 was dug deeper by the other types that were already online.

          If memory serves correctly, there was a brief time-second half of ’84 if I remember correctly-where PS had four…four types in service at the same time: the 727, DC-9, MD-80, and the 146. It wasn’t long.

          And the CEO you’re referring to, one Russel Ray also had the dubious honor of being the one who shut down Pan Am. Is he still around? I wonder if he was friends with Jeff Erickson. That was also a name that if you saw coming, you should’ve ran. I think that every single airline he ever touched all either got bought out or went under.

          1. Dan GOLDZBAND Avatar
            Dan GOLDZBAND

            The CEO was Paul Barkley, a man chronically unsuited to run a retail company.

          2. Brett Avatar

            Matt – In 1984, here’s what SkyGo shows for PSA:
            146 – 7,552 flights
            72S – 10,722 flights
            D98 – 6,531 flights
            D9S – 12,406 flights
            M80 – 76,053 flights

            I’m assuming D98 and M80 are the same but they changed the code they used midway through the year. The D98 doesn’t show up after 1984.

            1. Matt D Avatar
              Matt D

              That M80 total was almost the same number of flights that United Shuttle/Shuttle By United flew daily between LAX-SFO in around 2000.

              That was another hot mess. Wasn’t the delay rate something like an obscene 75% on some days because of overscheduling and the “fun” SFO fog?

          3. Dan GOLDZBAND Avatar
            Dan GOLDZBAND

            Sometimes I think PSA never met an airplane salesman it didn’t like.

        2. 1990 Avatar
          1990

          Dan, did you ever get the chance to fly on PSA’s ‘smiling’ TriStar with the built-in stairs?

          1. Dan GOLDZBAND Avatar
            Dan GOLDZBAND

            No, the Tristar came and went so fast. I only remember seeing it parked at SAN. And missed my chance to tour it in its present role in Kansas City.

            If indeed the use of 727’s caused such financial damage that it crippled PSA even after the type was retired, I guess that the airline’s brief use of a few 737’s should have continued. Always wondered why they did not embrace that type more. Personal note, took a girl flying on a PSA charity flight on one of their 737’s. She’d never been on a plane.

            1. 1990 Avatar
              1990

              Ahh, yes, the “TriStar Experience”… N910TE is still a “flying classroom” at MCI, managed by KC Aviation STEM.

      2. JT8D Avatar
        JT8D

        The fall of Eastern can be traced all the way back to Eddie Rickenbacker, who created an unbelievably toxic corporate culture that subsequent managements were unable to fully unwind – not that they were necessarily any better. But labor turmoil was standard at Eastern long, long before Borman got there. There was even a membership organization of passengers called WHEAL back in the 1950s and 1960s – We Hate Eastern Air Lines – the airline had a terrible, terrible reputation for customer service.

        Borman was a well-meaning man who was unsuited to managing an airline. He started off as an air force pilot – in general, fighter pilots (whether Air Force, Navy or Marine) are poorly suited to be airline executives. They come out of a world where the success of a mission is up to them (because it’s just them, maybe plus a navigator/weapons officer) in the cockpit. Other military backgrounds can work better – a platoon is a team, and you need team players in corporate settings. Kind of the same thing as an astronaut – it’s you and maybe two other guys in a tiny capsule and while mission control is in your ear, otherwise you’re the man. But there were other guys in between Borman and Rickenbacker who were also not great.

        When Alfred Kahn was asked (in 1977 – five years before your 1982 date) by Jimmy Carter to deregulate the airlines, he asked Carter’s domestic policy advisor, Stuart Eisenstat, whether the US govt was really ready to allow Pan Am and Eastern to go bankrupt. And the answer was yes.

        The point being that Eastern and Pan Am were well known basket cases way before deregulation. Everyone understood that those airlines, unless they got their **** together, were the most likely to fail in deregulation – and fail they did, ironically in the same year. Did they have to fail? No, not at all. But basically none of the airlines had any idea how to deal with deregalation. Crandall & Co at American figured it out better than most, and in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king, and among the old airlines, that one-eyed man was Crandall. Pan Am and Eastern had terrible managements, by comparison. But they also had unusually recalcitrant labor. Their labor leaderships and managements deserved each other – the rank-and-file, obviously, were collateral damage.

        1. Eric R Avatar
          Eric R

          A lot of reasons why an airline fails. One thing I can say about Eastern / PanAm / and even Braniff for that matter is that their domestic networks were all poorly structured to attract the necessary volume of domestic passengers to succeed in the deregulation era.

          PanAm never had a domestic connecting hub, Eastern’s hub were all located in the east and never were able to maintain a hub in the central or western US. Braniff just had Dallas and when AA came in full force, Braniff had no other hub to offset the losses in DFW.

          The airlines that survived into the following century had a more balanced domestic network with more than one hub.

          1. JT8D Avatar
            JT8D

            In the case of Braniff and Eastern, clearly untrue. Braniff at DFW was probably the second-best developed hub in the US pre-deregulation behind Delta at Atlanta. It also had an aircraft that, at the time, was reasonably well suited for task – the 727.

            Eastern was one of the Big Five – it had a poorly developed network on the western side of the US, but in terms of the eastern side of the country it was extremely competitive, including marquee routes like the Eastern Shuttle which had an incredible clientele – basically every New York, Boston and Washington DC businessman (mostly men back then), politician, media personality, celebrity etc. On any given day it a large fraction of the movers and shakers were on the Shuttle. Eastern owned Miami, Philly, it had a huge position in a lot of east coast markets. It owned a lot of the Caribbean (along with American).

            Eastern’s issues weren’t about revenue potential, it was about costs, strategy and management. If someone clever like Bob Crandall had been at Eastern instead of American, the outcome might have been quite different. But a guy like Borman had no ability to think strategically about marketing and network and so forth. They defended their position on New York to Miami literally to the death – that’s dumb.

            I’d say the same might even have been true about Pan Am. I think everyone underestimates just how undermanaged was that airline. The Smithsonian has the papers (and they’re digitized) of an airline executive/consultant who was retained to look at Pan Am in the early 1980s. And he discussed hair-raising basic deficiencies and you realize, reading the report, that this is the result of decades of undermanagement. For instance, no inventory controls, so spare parts could be (and were) ripped off. That’s gross negligence. Shareholders should have been suing the airline for lack of basic fiduciary responsibility. Then you think about the asinine cost of the merger with National and imagine, again, that someone clever like Crandall was there and what such a person might have done instead with those resources. If Pan Am had *grown* a domestic network (rather than acquired) it would at least have realized the benefit of juniority, as new pilots come on board. JFK at the time was empty – imagine it grew a hub there. But again, when you read that consultant report, you realize that one of the biggest issues was simply decades of not even taking care of management basics. What if it took the opportunity in the late 70s (when there was significant demand) to sell some of its 747s and rebalance the fleet.

            Of all the resources in the airline industry, the one in shortest supply, even today, is management talent. American was blessed with one of the few smart guys in the industry. If that guy had been, instead, at any of the other Big 5, and maybe even Pan Am, I think there’s a decent chance we’d talk about that airline the way we talk about American today.

            1. Eric R Avatar
              Eric R

              Braniff had a great hub in Dallas. I’m not saying they didn’t.

              But it was their only true connecting hub and that was the issue. When AA came in and started to expand at scale at DFW and the price war started, Braniff had no other hubs to fall back on (or support the losses at DFW).

            2. JT8D Avatar
              JT8D

              Braniff’s death had a lot more to do with massive expansion across the world than competition with American at DFW.

    2. Bevvy Avatar
      Bevvy

      Not a single reference to Delta. He must be an imposter! :-)

      1. 1990 Avatar
        1990

        Shh, shh… smooth sailing for now… don’t rock the boat…

  7. John G Avatar
    John G

    I have fond memories of Braniff, and that airline more than any other made me into a lifetime avgeek.

    Living in Lubbock in the mid 70s as a kid, there wasn’t much to do on some days (imagine four kids on a hot day south no cartoons, videos, or phones, or iPads). So we would go sit at the airport and watch planes. Those multi colored BI planes were awesome.

    At the time Lubbock was served by them, Texas international, and continental. AA didn’t fly there yet.

    Kind of a shame they failed.

    In the original DFW layout they had their own terminal, 2W (now Terminal B). American was in 2E and 3E (A and C now), and Delta 4E (now E).

    AA won the battle.

    1. Sidney M Avatar
      Sidney M

      Braniff rocked!! So did TWA!!

    2. JT8D Avatar
      JT8D

      A Splash of Colors by John Nance is a decent look at the collapse of Braniff, pretty much completely down to its autocratic leader, Harding Lawrence, who made disastrous post-deregulation decisions. Lawrence had, almost his entire career in the airline business, been celebrated as a wunderkind. It was the Peter Principal in action – finally put into a position that he was completely unable to deal with, but unable to recognize that because he’d been told, his entire life, that the sun shone out his rear end.

      Braniff was the biggest of the non-Big Five carriers (UA, AA, TW, EA and DL) at the dawn of deregulation. It had done pretty well in the decade or so up to 1978 – better than average for sure. Probably its best move was to sell out to someone else – might have been hard, because the CAB was not necessarily in favor of that kind of thing intially. But it might have been successful selling out to say, Delta or United, at that time either would have been reasonably end-to-end (i.e. not anti-competitive). Or maybe Braniff could have pre-emptively sold to American before American started building up in DFW.

      Harding Lawrence had basically no idea at all how to manage a post-deregulation airline, and he was up against Crandall, who did. But Braniff’s demise was more about Lawrence’s failure than Crandall’s successes.

      When celebrating Crandall as a genius, it helps to remember that he got lucky that way – Braniff took itself out without a lot of heavy lifting by Crandall, gifting American the Dallas/Ft Worth hub.

  8. Roger Cohen Avatar
    Roger Cohen

    If AI helps recount this history easier, then count me in (charts didn’t bother me because I’m legally color blind.)

    But I LIVED this history of LAX in the 1980’s as TWA’s Director of Government Affairs based in our hangar at 7001 World Way West. Freed by dereg, opened multiple airports (and later closed) for TWA — LGB, JWA, RNO — American never had a West Coast based gov’t affs presence out west, unlike UA, PSA, Western, Continental.

    Years may have fogged my memory but I’m not sure it was “Golden Gate” Airways, I flew “Golden West”. Cranky might want to fact check his AI tool, lol. But looking forward to Part 2!

    1. Brett Avatar

      Roger – Arggh! This wasn’t AI. AI just built the charts. This was me mixing things up. There was both a Golden West and Golden Gate and both had notable operations at LAX. But you are right that Golden West was the bigger one. Golden Gate is on the San Jose chart, so I just got my names crossed. (It doesn’t help that GG and GW were the two codes, so they were similar and easy to mix up) I just fixed it.

    2. CraigTPA Avatar
      CraigTPA

      Golden West was a “commuter” that interlined at one point or another with a lot of partners. In the 70s they mainly flew Twin Otters, but expanded to Shorts 360s and some DHC-7s, going out of business in 1983. Golden Gate was a regional airline that was a merger of Gem State and Air Pacific, giving it an odd fleet of Metroliners, CV-580s, and DHC-7s, which got even stranger when it merged with Swift Aire and its Nord 262s and F.27s. It went bye-bye in 1981.

      I flew Golden Gate a few times between San Francisco and Fresno, including a lovely 7 hour bus ride one Christmas Eve from BFL to FAT because the flight crew didn’t have the necessary certificate hours to do an instrument landing in the very dense fog in Fresno. About an hour north of BFL we hit the Tule fog – it looked like a wall as we drove toward it. Sigh. But GG did let me get the Dash 7 and the CV-580 on my lifetime plane list!

  9. Roger Cohen Avatar
    Roger Cohen

    Brett — No problem, but I distinctly treasuring my Golden West term pass. Actually used it to fly LAX-JWA (then SNA) for a date with a girl who lived in Orange County. That’s how much a “world of difference” was between LA and Orange County in 1980.

    And that’s when the 405 trip was a helluva’ lot faster than it is now.

    1. JT8D Avatar
      JT8D

      Pre-Bradley terminal, the area at the end of the LAX horseshoe was basically empty tarmac where the commuters like Golden West hung out. If you were connecting terminals and walked around the end of the horseshoe, you got a view of these commuters loading up their Twin Otters and other small-aircraft cats and dogs. This, of course, was also the era of the one-level LAX – the second level was built for the 1984 Olympics. It was a very different feel walking around LAX when it was a single level. I remember running across the one-level infield in 1976 as a kid.

  10. Alan Soulitos Avatar
    Alan Soulitos

    AA and it’s DC-10. They seemed to fly them everywhere in the 80’s. I grew up in SAT. Always made it a point to get my parents to buy a ticket on AA so we could fly the DC-10 from SAT to DFW and onto SFO. Now being in the business since the 80’s. What I would give to fly the DC-10 again. The 80’s good times.

    1. Randy Avatar
      Randy

      Yes, AA85 from SAT-DFW. I worked in the tower then. It was always full on a Friday evening.

  11. Exit Row Seat Avatar
    Exit Row Seat

    Hats off to Bob Crandall. Had the gumption to push AA into the top tier. Also, he initiated the frequent flier franchise which kept PAX coming back for more.

    Today, AA is the last of the majors that I would select for a trip based on the cabin crew alone!! And the idea that I have to give up my 1st class seat for a dead heading crew member.
    Do these unions understand who is paying their wages??

    1. Matt D Avatar
      Matt D

      Up until about maybe ten or fifteen years ago, it was the fare paying passengers.

      But since then? All of us know that the airlines don’t make money doing that. Most of the time, it’s at best, a loss leader. The REAL money is in all of those credit card games.

      Too bad nobody thought of any of that back in the 1980’s or 1990’s. Yes, there were airline branded CC’s back then. But the programs were nothing like they are now.

      So who is paying you ask? Now, here in mid 2026, the answer would most likely be: the MILF’s you see at Target who whip out their AmEx cards at check out (as I stand behind, checking THEM out), who may or may not ever buy a plane ticket. At least not directly out of pocket anyway.

      But that’s now getting into slush fund territory. Want to have that discussion?

      1. Dan GOLDZBAND Avatar
        Dan GOLDZBAND

        Financial analysis correct, comment misogynistic.

      2. Exit Row Seat Avatar
        Exit Row Seat

        @Matt. If this is true, why don’t the airline “wet lease” all their operations to another airline or contractor. No union contracts to bother with, no leasing of expensive jets, no fuel bills, no jockeying for landing slots, no nothing! For AA PAX, service can’t get any worse than it is now. Better yet, sell only the airline operations to Private Equity. Just keep control of the FF program and pump out credit card applications like crazy!
        To push this theory, UA, AA, DL, and WN will be declared “Too Big To Fail” during the next financial crisis like 2008-09. However, they will be declared “financial institutions” and receive money from the TARP II program. IIRC, the airlines received financial aid as well in 2008-09. Therefore, the Big Four are protected on both sides of the deal.

        I think the Big Four hold on to airline operations for political leverage considering the number of employees and percentage of the GDP. Gives them leverage that a financial institution could only dream of. And if things get to out of wack, Chapter 11 is in the wings. Each (sans WN) have visited the court house in the past. Today, bankruptcy is the friend of the airlines!

        All this gets back to my original complaint. Why is AA customer service so bad!! As the charts above show, AA was a power house with Crandall at the controls. Passenger exceptions were met or exceeded; both leisure & business. Today, “Quarter Zip” is not in control and the inmates (ie: unions) are running the prison. Not a happy airline to fly on!!

  12. JT8D Avatar
    JT8D

    Deregulation went into effect 1 Jan 1979. In practice, the CAB was very permissive before then, especially in the last months of 1978, but that is the official date of the new regime.

    In fact, there was a gradual phase in. The modern regime wasn’t fully effective until about 1985. Airlines didn’t initially have full freedom to enter markets as they pleased, for instance.

    The modern conception of an airline, what we are still in many respects experience today, was defined in large part by American in the decade after (and in reaction to) deregulation. Yield management and frequent flyer programs were invented by American. Hub and spoke was not (Delta usually gets credit for that in pre-deregulation times at Atlanta) but American probably single-mindedly pursued it more than any other, to the point of ridiculousness with its failed hubs at RDU, BNA and SJC.

    The story of American’s growth at LAX with AirCal obviously doesn’t stop in 1990 – it takes a very nasty turn for the worse in 1991 when it dumped most of the intra-state flying after having its head handed to it by Southwest. Ditto with PSA and US Air. In fact, both American and US Air announced the dumping of most intra-state flying within a month of each other. It was one of the more remarkable episodes in which American and US Air both enabled Southwest to own intra-state California flying from 1991 onward. Not what they intended when they bought AirCal and PSA, but what they made happen.

    1. Matt D Avatar
      Matt D

      A little late to the party, but correct on all counts in your last paragraph. I don’t know about the others, but I’ll take your word for it.

      One thing I’ve always wondered. Could USAir have maybe made PSA work and hold onto what they bought had they kept the PSA name and branding and intact and just operated them as a subsidiary? Kind of like what Alaska is doing with Hawaiian. As far as I know, this is the first time in American (the country) history that an airline has done that.

      PSA as a standalone airline was, as I said in an earlier response, at or near the end of its viable life. But they had two things USAir did not: brand recognition and loyalty in CA. USAir at the time was all but entirely unknown west of the Rockies. Maybe even west of the Mississippi.

      Brett. I know that was a little before your time, but you ARE an expert.

      What are your thoughts?

      1. JT8D Avatar
        JT8D

        No. The issue with selling PSA to US Air and selling AirCal to American is they instantly imposed their costs on both, because US Air union rates were extended to PSA (whether or not it was called PSA) and Americans to AirCal. The extension of union contracts was mandated by the US Air and American labor contracts, no way to stop that.

        So that meant USAir and American jacked up intra-California fares. This caused bigtime unhappiness within California. There were California politicians grandstanding on the issue, threatening to establish a state carrier to bring back the $100 walk-up fare.

        They didn’t need to. There was ample gate space at OAK and SJC and LAX and BUR and ONT, etc, and Southwest used that gate space to enter LAX-OAK, etc and dropped the fares and neither US Air nor American could compete because Southwest’s costs were much, much lower and it had the financial sack to take them on – plus its passenger acceptance was enormous, because Southwest’s business model was based on the pre-deregulation PSA model, so California customers were like “yippee, we got our favorite business model back!”

        Then in 1990 Iraq invades Kuwait and the bottom drops out of the airline market. At that point both American and US Air were throwing things overboard to survive and both gutted the old PSA and AirCal networks, thereby handing California to Southwest.

        The purchase of AirCal by American and PSA by US Air were enormous mistakes. It’s another thing to keep in mind when crediting Crandall with being a genius. He got a lot right, but he also made his share of mistakes, and AirCal was a doozy.

      2. Brett Avatar

        I’m with JT8D. Not only was there a cost issue, but you also do have a lean, mean, Southwest machine waiting in the wings. The costs, of course, made that even easier for Southwest to get in there and crush USAir’s hopes and dreams. PSA’s only real chance was as a standalone that was run better. But by the mid-1980s, it quickly had no real options. It was lucky USAir was interested.

        1. Leo B Avatar
          Leo B

          To what extent did the USAir purchase of PSA enable USAir to have a viable transcontinental service? or to improve transcontinental service?

          1. Brett Avatar

            Leo B – I don’t think it did. Maybe in the beginning it helped with some feed, but that short-haul flying didn’t last long anyway.

        2. Iowa Airspace Avatar
          Iowa Airspace

          Imho almost every answer to either question “why couldn’t an airline do xyz” or “why did an airline do abc” in the 80s and 90s was “legacy/pre-deregulation airline costs were too high to sustain in the deregulated industry.”

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