Thanks to Southwest’s elimination of its differentiators, both United CEO Scott Kirby and Delta President Glen Hauenstein said last week that in competitive markets, Southwest’s customers are up for grabs. Scott took things further in his chat at the JP Morgan Industrials Conference as he explained what should happen next.
I think the far bigger thing… it’s the slaying of a sacred cow. It’s one of the two big things that get Southwest back to industry-leading margin, that and stop flying places that lose money. Those who should be willing to slay one, maybe want to slay two, I don’t know.
Southwest wants to lean on its people as being the big difference, but it’s really going to be about price and schedule since it has no other tangible advantages. So maybe that second sacred cow is on the table. In a price-and-schedule world, I decided to take a swing at some Cirium data to try to think about the airline’s network.
For the legacy carriers, the key has always been about dominating your markets. Yes, there are smaller competitive markets, but being #1 in a big city matters. It’s a version of the vaunted S-curve at work.
So what if we thought about Southwest’s network from that perspective? I’m assuming, importantly, that the airline still only has 737s and hasn’t branched out, and it hasn’t considered major changes to its product beyond what’s already been announced. If those things change, well, that changes the equation entirely.
I started by looking at July 2025 seats for every market Southwest served, and I do mean “market” and not “airport.” In other words, it’s Chicago, not Midway. Anywhere you see a city name with multiple airports, it’s meant to include the metro area because that’s what really matters.
Then, I started cutting markets out that didn’t matter. I threw out international and San Juan flying since those are just spokes for travelers from the lower 48, at least they are in the Southwest network. And long-haul isn’t a helpful comparison. I did the same for the ski markets in Montrose and Steamboat Springs. It’s possible some of those should go and some should stay, but they should only stay in support of the market at the other end of the route.
There was the issue of Hawaiʻi, but I decided to shelve it and ignore. That too is not a huge part of the business, but it is more than just a destination with all that interisland flying. It’s a distraction from the key task at hand, so let’s just pretend it doesn’t exist.
With that, I could focus on the main parts of the network, and I came up with this map that will need more explanation:
Map was created using Doughton Data Solutions service. doughtondata.com
Let’s start with the size of the dots. Those are based entirely on how many seats Southwest has departing from the city during that month:
- Biggest (e.g. Las Vegas): > 500,000 seats (~100 daily departures or more)
- Big (e.g. Sacramento): 250,000 to 499,999 seats (~50-99 daily departures)
- Smaller (e.g. Reno): 100,000 to 249,999 seats (~20-49 daily departures)
- Smallest (e.g. Lubbock): < 100,000 seats (~20 daily departures or less)
That’s the easy part, but what about the colors? I decided to look at a couple of metrics. First, anything in gray is a market where Southwest is not #1. We’ll talk more about those later.
For the other three colors, I looked at a combination of seat share vs the #2 airline as well as the number of destinations that Southwest serves from that city.
- Red: Strong on both metrics
- Blue: Strong on at least one of the metrics
- Yellow: Not strong on either metric
So what does this tell us? Well, nobody should be surprised that the strongest markets are those in the southern half of the country.
The Strengths
There are five markets that are both big and where Southwest has a significant schedule advantage over the rest:
- Austin
- Las Vegas
- Nashville
- Orlando
- St Louis
These are all good markets for the airline, though to me it’s Austin and Nashville that are the real long-term opportunities for future growth and dominance. Las Vegas falls in the same boat, but that’s more as an origin since most other airlines treat Vegas as a destination. It’s still a big city, and Southwest is the airline that caters to people there. That’s similar to Orlando, but I think of Orlando as a tougher market competitively. Then there’s St Louis.
St Louis may not be a huge growth market, but there may be some opportunity, especially if the airline tries to route connections through there more than Midway as it continues to build hubs. (I know, I know, I sound like AA management after buying TWA.) Also, this is the kind of market that’s the backbone of what makes Southwest work. It is a good-sized city that Southwest quickly moved to dominate when the old hub carrier left. Kansas City, though a little smaller, falls into that same bucket, and there are many other cities in red, big and small, from there to the south and west that Southwest will want to rely on.
But there are other important nodes in the network that aren’t so clear cut:
Baltimore/Washington
You’ll note that Baltimore/Washington is a big market where Southwest is #1, but the advantage is not as strong. BWI is dominated by Southwest, and it is the best way for the airline to serve the Northeast US and beyond with partnering opportunities. It’s no surprise that BWI is where the first interline partnership with Icelandair started off. While United and American are big and important players at Dulles and National respectively, BWI serves a separate but overlapping catchment. This should remain the focus point for the entire Northeast US.
The LA Basin
In LA, Southwest is far from #1 at LAX where the others are, but it dominates all of the secondary airports (Burbank, Long Beach, Ontario, and Orange County). It has enormous utility, and it has been reducing its reliance on LAX to focus further on secondary airports. This is a good strategy that will continue at least until Southwest has a better product, but LAX probably will be an increasingly unimportant part of the network compared to the secondaries.
Phoenix and the Valley of the Sun
I said I’d talk about the gray dots later, and now is that time. Despite being behind American in Phoenix, I still see that market as a winner for Southwest. American has neglected it until relatively recently and from a utility perspective, American has minimal long-haul at the airport. In other words, Southwest can be more competitive than in a place like DFW. There is also room to grow here as Southwest continues to fill out its relatively new concourse. Yes, it’s very close to Las Vegas, but the two can work in tandem as useful hubs in addition to the local traffic.
Steady Markets
While the markets listed above seem like good growth opportunities (if Southwest can get the gates), there are plenty that play an important role but may not be primed for growth. These are the markets that are gray dots. There is another airline in each city, but they tend to use a different airport.
Dallas Metroplex
There is no growth opportunity at Love Field, but Southwest will undoubtedly maintain its presence at its home airport. The question is whether it grows into other airports. I can see something like McKinney to the northeast of town, but I have a hard time thinking DFW is going to work when American flies to so many more destinations with so much more frequency.
Greater Houston
Southwest does have a nice position at Hobby airport, but it’s not going to ever beat United as the #1 in the city. Hobby and IAH are pretty far from each other, however, so Southwest isn’t leaving. I just don’t see where much growth is likely from there unless Southwest makes a concerted effort to go into non-leisure foreign markets. That doesn’t seem like the lowest-hanging fruit.
Chicagoland
There is no clear answer here. Yes, Southwest dominates Midway, but it continues to be dwarfed by United in Chicago overall. American may have fewer seats than Southwest, but it has more flights to more destinations. The move into O’Hare didn’t work, but the airline is in a strong position in Milwaukee to the north. That being said, if American scales back, all bets are off.
The Big Question Marks
While the ones above seem like relatively clear options, there are some that make me wonder if a more drastic decision should be made.
Denver
Southwest loved Denver when United wasn’t paying attention to local traffic and Frontier went ULCC. But now, United cares. It is growing quickly there, trying to win back the market, and Southwest with its single fleet type can’t have the same utility. With Frontier offering a product closer or even exceeding Southwest’s, it gets even tougher to reach the price-sensitive crowd. Denver is a huge station in the Southwest network, but it really only matters for connectivity into the Pac NW where the airline remains weak anyway.
The SF Bay Area
Southwest is big in Oakland and San Jose, but those markets are not what they once were, especially Oakland. SFO continues to be the leader of the pack, and United has been building its lead and making life more difficult for others. Instead, Southwest has been focusing its efforts on Sacramento which has been a much better and less competitive market that I think has good growth prospects. Does the Bay Area matter? Yes, but it’s fair to ask whether the operation is bigger than it should be.
San Diego
This may come as a surprise. After all, Southwest is #1 in the market, and new gates are coming online that will enable further growth. But this is also a market that Alaska covets. In fact, it’s the one important competitive market that the two airlines share. This does not mean Southwest should leave, but depending upon what Alaska does, Southwest may want to think about how big this station should be. Similar to the Bay Area, there is an argument to be made for focusing on short-haul where it does best.
The Slot Controlled Airports
The Northeast US is a real question mark. Should Southwest have operations as large as it has at LaGuardia and National? Or is it possible that it’s the slots that just make them think differently. (This is a problem for every airline.) There is likely too much service from Southwest in the Northeast across the board. This is an area most ripe for cutbacks.
What Does This Mean?
This is just a high level consideration of the network and undoubtedly those with internal data can do far better. But nobody should take this as gospel, it’s just opening a conversation. The question is now more about who has the stomach to make big changes now that the business model has changed.
Will people be willing to shrink or even pull the airline out of markets that don’t make sense any longer? Further, will Southwest consider new aircraft types that might enable different types of flying? Will Southwest have further product changes that would impact this? Would Southwest be willing to cede geography or is that a sign of weakness that can’t be tolerated? There are no simple answers here or the changes would have been made already.
66 comments on “With Southwest’s Big Change, It’s Time to Rethink the Network”
I feel you are giving WN a little too much credit. Only one daily non-stop between MSY and south east Florida. I wish WN would dial back more to its “direct” roots. If I have to make a connection, might as well fly AA (non-stops to MIA), or DL (connect in ATL) as opposed to HOU, DAL, or BWI for WN.
Again, WN is morphing into a legacy carrier format. There’s lots of competition in that strata, but I feel Elliot fails to appreciate that.
You did this analysis on your own over a weekend. Why were Southwest with all their employees, resources, data and number-crunching capacity unable to start thinking on these lines years ago ? It just makes me think Elliott were right to be pushing hard to rouse a sleeping giant from its slumbers.
Throw in Courtney’s profitability analysis from Visual Approach. Supports much of what you say (WN does well in PHX!) but shows that Southern California is a mixed bag, the northeast is rough. (These are just WN’s largest 25 markets — imagine that BOS, PHL, LGA are real stinkers.)
https://visualapproach.io/painful-end-to-a-53-year-streak/#answer
Good analysis – thanks for sharing! Two additional thoughts:
1) I think they’re gonna get they’re lunch eaten on connecting traffic. I live in one of those small grey dots (so we’re pretty used to the connecting life) and can’t imagine why we’d now chose a BWI or BNA connection on WN over CLT/ATL on AA/DL. I know we’re not really a core part of WN’s business but if you lose enough business in those small grey dots, it’ll add up eventually (specifically I wonder how many of those fortress hubs in secondary cities – the big red dots – could still support a strong network if they’re hemorrhaging O/D traffic from the small grey dots).
2) I had the same thought about the 737s. If you’re changing your identity on everything else… why keep yourself limited by aircraft type?
Couldn’t agree more with the DEN commentary. DEN’s story could very well play out similar to ATL – a big connector hub for a legacy operator in a geographically optimal part of the country. The scale that UA should be able to build out (freq, gauge, dest) will continue to marginalize WN and force their downsizing as they “win the S-curve”, similar to what has occurred in ATL
With respect to PHX, it Always felt like American was more focused on he connecting passenger than Southwest, especially when it came to scheduling. Curious to know what the share of local Phoenix area passengers looks like between AA & Southwest.
Eric – For the 12 months ending Q3 2024, Southwest carried about 38% of domestic passengers originating in Phoenix while American was at 28%.
WN gets 34% of local PHX passengers, compared to 28% for AA, 10% DL, 8% UA, 7% F9, 4% AS, 1% WS, 7% OA.
I’d love to know what Southwest is thinking on some of this. Just for example, they’ve announced FAT-SAN starting in October. Admittedly, that’s a long way out, but the basic question is even more valid with Southwest’s recent mutation: why?
Alaska took a chance on FAT-SAN a while back and, to a bit of a surprise to a lot of people (including this former Fresnan), it caught on. The sample date I picked (Wed, Oct 22) shows Alaska flying 3x with E-175s. Now Southwest is going to add 2 737s of some flavour (Orbitz didn’t show that detail) on this route.
I’d thought this was being driven by the Fresno end but had doubts – are there really that many more Fresnan who want to go to SAN on a give day? If WN wants to compete more for Fresnan connecting passengers, a frequency add to LAS or DEN or opening FAT-MDW would all make more sense.
Or is this just WN wanting to attack Alaska to shore up their position at SAN?
CraigTPA – Intracal flying has always been Southwest’s bread and butter, so this is just an extension of that. The problem is that Southwest doesn’t really have the right airplane to do this market, but Alaska does!
I remember when WN started moving into the PacNW in the 90s (I was doing a fair amount of PDX-LAX as I traveled between college and home). I also knew a number of QX pilots, and I know they mentioned that AS was moving aggressively back then to use QX to push back against WN encroaching on the AS home market, since QX could compete very well on CASM. Just looking at the map above, it’s obvious that AS was pretty successful in defending against WN. I have to think AS management is over-the-moon on the recent WN moves; gives them a good opportunity to try and grab a lot more intra-CA flying (plus weakens their inter-island competitor, which was of topic here)
Just like the legacies are going to attack WN, WN should bulk up in cities where NK and F9 have a strong presence (crew base).
Spirit has a base in DTW that might be vulnerable, DL fortress notwithstanding. Same for Frontier’s base in PHL which could force their retreat to TTN.
Frontier bases at CLE and CVG could be vulnerable as most local flyers only choose them because they backfilled nonstops lost when their hubs were eliminated. WN could also try to crush their MDW base.
Lesser opportunities exist for different competitive reasons but it’s worth noting that Southwest already has a significant presence at Spirit base FLL, Frontier bases in TPA and PHX, as well as LAS and MCO which are bases for both Spirit and Frontier.
This probably isn’t news to most here, but I find Southwest’s weakness in the northwestern quarter of the country striking. This explains why I haven’t flown Southwest in decades. The furthest south I’ve lived (in North America) was Cleveland, and the last time I tried WN was to go from Wisconsin to Denver for the 2007 World Series. We booked on WN for their no change fees since we weren’t sure if we could get tickets to a game despite it being a four hour drive to MDW for us, which speaks to the advantage they once had. Wound up not getting Red Sox-Rockies tickets. I think we managed to use the value on that WN ticket to go home for the holidays, but it’s now been 18 years since Southwest’s network was useful for us, and I see why from this map!
Agree on Southwest not being very useful to those in the Northeast. If you (as a pax) aren’t going to a WN stronghold, or aren’t willing to connect through BWI when flying south (which I’ve done, and it’s not bad, but why connect through any airport if you can find a nonstop that works for a reasonable price?), there’s rarely a good reason to fly WN from the Northeast, especially down the East Coast. Unlike Delta, American, or JetBlue, WN just doesn’t have that East Coast nonstops between the Northeast and (non-Orlando) destinations.
To be clear, I’m not saying it should have those nonstops (the market is probably pretty saturated, depending on how one measures it), just agreeing that WN is relativelyu weak in the Northeast.
(I was talking about the northwest, where WN is even less useful, but agreed that their utility is limited in the northeast too!)
Ah, thanks. My mistake in misreading your comment.
BWI is my home airport and WN certainly dominates. Their commitment is deep – Southwest’s first east coast maintenance facility is under construction at the airport. Your comment “BWI serves a separate but overlapping catchment” in the greater Baltimore / DC region is very true. It pulls traffic from the DC market while being the primary airport for Baltimore area travelers. It will be interesting to see how Spirit’s renewed commitment plays out, but I would love to see Delta establish BWI as a focus city – they have a really large ticket counter area that always seems crowded and this would give the last of the three legacies a focus / hub in the region.
Did you merge PVD and MHT into BOS?
Alex – Yes, those are considered part of the same metro area.
Another great article from CF that apparently attempts to answer the unstated question of “what doesn’t work w/ WN” but stops short of making recommendations.
Elliott obviously believed WN’s product doesn’t work and they pressured WN to drop everything that was distinctly WN to end up w/ a product portfolio that is a subset of the legacy carriers. Neither this article or Elliott’s recommendations seem to address WN’s fleet or labor issues, the latter of which is now legacy expensive without having legacy (big 3 plus AS) revenues.
I’m not sure that it is really valid to throw out airport attributes just for the sake of revenue; the analysis ends up with the largest hub in a metro area winning – but that isn’t what makes a hub viable. It doesn’t matter whether WN or AA is the largest carrier in a metro but whether it is profitable. Although Scott Kirby is convinced his airline runs all hubs profitably, he can’t put all of his together in a network that is the MOST profitable US airline. Clearly, how hubs fit together in a network matters and WN’s network has to be taken as a whole. They obviously connect some passengers over MCI and STL just as they might carry a percentage of connecting passengers as high or higher over MDW as AA and UA do at ORD.
Some airports like DAL very likely siphon off some of the best revenue in the N. Texas metroplex off of AA’s DFW hub but that is not likely true to the same degree for other WN ‘hubs’ including WN at HOU vs. UA at IAH or DL vs WN at ATL. WN had an advantage at HOU where revenues are not as great as at IAH when their costs were lower but that is probably far less true now.
WN’s network strength is based on the number of medium sized cities it dominates and, cumulatively that gives WN value. They do poorly in legacy carrier hubs where WN is smaller and the WN product compares less favorably. WN flies a lot of single flights to multiple hubs to create a lot of potential connections but likely still do not compete well in longhaul domestic connections compared to the legacies because their network is excessively focused on short and medium high flights, esp. to/from leisure markets. I suspect that data shows that WN gets a pretty small percentage of secondary NE to western US markets such as PVD or BUF to cities on the west coast that rely totally on connections throughout the industry.
I also don’t think you can exclude Hawaii. WN ventured into not just the mainland to Hawaii market based on the justification to provide more value to its loyalty program – which other US carriers have done – but also into the intra-Hawaii market. Hawaii has got to be a huge drag on WN’s finances.
I suspect that, no matter what WN achieves, Elliott will take greater control and force more changes at WN when WN’s time for its standalone plan runs out.
I wouldn’t be surprised if UA is profitable at all its hubs. The challenge for UA is that many of their hubs are competitive hubs for other carriers as well (DEN, LAX, ORD, SFO).
Airlines don’t release profitability by hub and, although there is a huge amount of public data that can be used to estimate profitability, there are lots of assumptions, not the least of which is to how – or not – to allocate non-transportation revenue. It would be no surprise if UA finds its hubs profitable and other carriers are not using only transportation revenue given that UA has the least lucrative credit card contract of the big 3. Credit cards, vacation sales, ancillary fees such as for bags and seats as well as maintenance revenue are part of the US airline model.
Even if UA accurately does allocate revenue and costs for the above as other airlines do, there is nothing that requires every airline or business to do everything profitability. Most merchants have loss leaders that they justify by the value to their greater business. UA makes the same claim about serving far-flung places like Mongolia to the value of their loyalty program even though they serve cities like that on a less than daily seasonal basis on narrowbodies.
The only real issue about hub vs. system profitability is that there are laws that prevent predatory pricing to drive a competitor out of a market. The only reason why carriers have not filed predatory pricing claims based on hub profitability (or not) of competitors is because they, like every other carrier, likely operate parts of their network at a loss. US courts have decided they cannot win predatory pricing charges against network airlines in all but the narrowest cases.
While the comparisons are about hub profitability are often between DL and UA, the real issue is that AA and WN both ended 2024 with system net profit margins that were below 2% which means that, fully allocated, large portions of AA and WN’s networks and most of the rest of LCC and ULCC sector are unprofitable. THAT is unsustainable from a financial standpoint.
And, specific to UA, they have a $1 billion labor cost advantage right now compared to DL including profit sharing and wage rates because their FAs and mechanics are not at the same industry pay rates as the rest of the big 4. And despite UA’s claim about its hub profitability, they don’t generate industry leading net profitability.
The real takeaway is that WN’s network – like AA’s – is not anywhere close to being acceptably profitable. There MIGHT be parts of DL and UA’s networks that are not delivering consistent profits but there are large portions – if not all – of AA and WN’s networks that don’t come close to meeting DL and UA’s levels of profitability.
The real question is what WN has to do to get its profitability back to acceptable levels and, if it succeeds, what are the implications for AA and other carriers that are not working near as hard to turn themselves around.
SMF is only strong for WN because of the State of California contract. It is the backbone of the airport’s frequencies…and, it is the backbone to a lesser extent to the other SoCal airports not named LAX. Now that the two bags policy is changing, it will be really interesting to see what the State does because that helps keep costs down.
AS has been making inroads on the SMF-SAN market for years on the State contract, especially since its prices tend to be 30-40% cheaper than WN on that route…and that’s with paying the bag fee! I can see them going after more of the SoCal market from SMF and really put the squeeze on WN.
Seeing Paper Boarding Pass’ comment on Southwest “getting back it’s roots” with direct flights, I was reminded of one of Kelleher’s mantras during the airline’s early, high growth days. Something like “we’re competing with driving”.
They found sweet spots by offering direct flights in the 150-500 mile range on routes that were not well-served by bigger competitors. The principal was there were two paths to growing the company: direct competing and poaching another airlines’ passenger bookings or finding latent demand and offering an attractive flight option that would grow the number of air passenger trips between the two cities.
I respect starting with the biggest dots and the S curve analogy, but moving the second- and third-largest dots up a level in size (and doing the same on the color levels in those markets) certainly has some promise, too.
For example, the string of three yellow dot mid-sized cities across the Midwest (IND, CMH and PIT) with large SWA hubs at either end (STL and BWI) caught my eye. To a significant degree, these three non-hub cities in the middle have direct flight gaps, both by Southwest and the legacies. In those instances, Southwest offers out-of-the way connections through Chicago, St. Louis or BWI. That is a hub and spoke operation that offers no compelling advantage to a legacy flight through one of their hubs.
With the ULCC’s largely chasing 500 mile+ routes, I think “Hit ’em where they ain’t” in connecting mid-sized markets is a legitimate growth alternative to the strategy options outlined in this analysis.
I agree with this, I think SW needs to focus on 2 types of flying from each airport
1) Short haul nonstop on interesting that replaces driving (e.g., the intra-CA and TX stuff)
2) Flying to hubs
On 1), this is where they are market leaders, what they do well, and often peel customers from other airlines. It would be interesting if they can build other regional areas like CA and TX where this can work. Then 2) helps them build a network, fill in excess capacity for short-haul flying, and retain some customers. I think they will struggle to compete purely on 2), as the legacies all do that better especially now as SW eliminated all their differentiators, but maybe they have quite a bit of travelers that do a lot of 1) and so stick with SW for their 2) flying.
SW is currently doing other medium-haul non-stop flying that is a bit random and frequency, Spirit/Frontier-esque. The problem is that premium customers are more schedule-sensitive, so (for example) SW can offer a 1x/daily nonstop in a market in the morning, but a premium customer would rather stick with a legacy and connect because they don’t want to leave until the afternoon. This low-frequency flying works for ULCC (Spirit/Frontier/Allegiant) because they are offering ULCC prices targeted at leisure that is flexible, but it is not going to work for SW at their costs.
Then SW has a legacy markets like CRP and I have no idea what it’s still doing there. How in the world do they compete with UA, when SW flies 3x/daily CRP-HOU only, and UA offers double the frequency CRP-IAH plus way more connecting options via IAH than SW via HOU? Plus connecting customers can also fly AA that offers ~7x/daily to DFW.
Re: CRP competition. I picture Corpus as a sort of a three-way-tie small market that probably hasn’t changed much at all over the years.
Embraers vs. 737’s is a factor in the comparison you make. Those three WN flights to HOU have as many (more?) seats as UA’s six flights to IAH. Yes, UA has more destinations from IAH but many of those that make up the difference are either international or regional Ark-La-Tex flights to small cities, both categories that wouldn’t draw a large number of CRP passengers to any single destination. The capitulation of the CRP-Dallas market to AA is notable, but likely not absolute given WN’s hourly weekday flights between HOU and DAL.
I think CRP is an interesting case study, though, for turning that small gray dot to another color. First, there are only three destinations from CRP in total. A short-hop to SAT or AUS would create some additional, better-timed WN connecting options to the west vs. HOU, IAH or DFW, and AUS in particular meets the driving distance sweet spot I discussed above. Second, CRP is an example of an edge-of-network, small market (all airlines), WN small dot city on that may represent an opportunity for market-level new looks at direct vs. connecting options. E.g. WN might look for a fourth direct airport that competes favorably as a non-stop vs. the AA and UA’s connecting options. Studying connecting traffic originating from CRP would reveal the current fourth-place O-D pair out of CRP. A well-timed WN 2x daily non-stop to that city would likely bring a net positive number of new WN passengers, particularly if that is a city not well-served with WN connections through HOU. Third: throw a CRP-DAL route into the analysis, too, for completeness. Maybe there are some AA passengers who would like to land at DAL vs. DFW or make connections through DAL vs. DFW.
Now we’re way down that S-curve, though. Moving from 3 WN CRP departing flights per day to 4, 5 or 6 is a big % change, but doesn’t move the needle much overall.
Re: CRP-DAL: WN has only so many slots available at Love, due to lack of gates. They would rather use those on larger markets.
They just don’t have the gate space to run a large hub.
And if the demand was there to go to other WN hubs from CRP (such as STL or BNA) they would have done so already.
This got me thinking about the “through” flights, taking advantage of simplifying travel between secondary city pairs.
This can be marketed again to be a competitive advantage – why fly on AA and stress and run through CLT on their classic 35min connections. I believe there was an effort to reduce them the last few years though. And I wonder if the switch to assigned seating is going to make through flights more difficult on tech and passenger experience.
Maybe so few passengers can benefit from them that it’s not worth it.
Interesting to see there are still two through flights CRP-HOU-DAL on a random weekday next week, but SW is charging a few dollars more than AA’s nonstop, so you’d have to really want to fly SW or arrive in DAL to take it, to pay more for fewer frequencies and double the flight time.
I know we’re talking about schedules and markets but this statement hits me.
“Southwest wants to lean on its people as being the big difference, but it’s really going to be about price and schedule since it has no other tangible advantages.”
I completely agree with that. And I honestly don’t think the “it’s about our people” angle is going to work out for them. I typically fly on either WN or AA, and at least in my experience, I’ve had just as good of experience with crews on both. Also, I think it would be a good topic to discuss what either legacies or ULCCs could do to try and take some of the disenfranchised WN customers.
I had a jokester of a flight attendant on a recent Spirit flight that made me do a doubletake and wonder if I was on a WN flight in disguise. One of the punchlines went something like, “And remember: No one likes your money more than we do at Spirit.”
Yes, I know that jokes don’t make the “people” aspect of service, but my point is that humorous service (just like good service) isn’t unique to WN’s people.
Agreed. My favorite one I’ll never forget was from a TWA flight in the 90’s That dude was hysterical! It almost was like the movie Tommy Boy. And I was on an AA flight in October 2021, the flight attendants were so attentive to my kids. Making sure they had snacks and were happy, etc. I very much appreciated that.
I’m based out of a small grey dot market (Santa Barbara) which post COVID has exploded in airline service with Southwest joining this market in April 2021 and Delta rejoining June of last year. We have had United, American and Alaska servicing this area for many years. As a local and regular business traveler I jumped on the opportunity to use Southwest, but I question some of their flight timing and destinations/connections.
1. From Santa Barbara, Las Vegas is not a bad place to connect through with a total one morning and one midday outward flight (sometimes late afternoon additional flight). They have a nighttime return flight which is good. Last year some of those opportunities were limited due to runway work at LAS and the Denver flight was a good back up. Both flights to LAS & DEN left in the morning. Las Vegas is back up to full speed and Denver was cancelled.
2. Through SWA, Sacramento has service from Santa Barbara but the timing is all wrong. You won’t believe how many government types drive to BUR southward to catch early morning flights to SMF to attend meetings at the capital and return the same night (otherwise they catch United flight through SFO but prone to fog cancellations). But the flight to Sacrmento from SBA is not until 10:55 AM and it’s return flight is at 4:40 PM the same day. Remember SBA is only minutes away from government centers of Santa Barbara and Ventura counties and less than 2 hours away from government center of San Luis Obispo county.
3. Like the Sacramento flight the timing is just off, the Oakland flight has a 10:20 morning arrival and a 5:20 PM departure. Not really good for planning.
Here’s is SYVJEFF’s suggestions to better utilize aircraft and bank time for ground crews for SWA at SBA!
a. LAS flights are good, maybe regular third flight a day to be consistent. See addition below.
b. Morning Sacramento flight out with early evening return and possibly use same aircraft and crew to continue to LAS to connect to red eyes. Or leave aircraft overnight.
c. Oakland be a mid morning arrival to SBA and return for midday outward bank at OAK. Most of the people I’ve seen on the OAK flight have been college students using the airline from Bay Area rather than Amtrak.
I’m pretty sure there are markets of the same size that need a rethink too. Let me know your thoughts.
I was caught on a weather mess at DFW Friday, trying to get to Denver. Wound up driving to OKC and flying Frontier.
It was fine. No different from the experience on Southwest. Neither has power outlets. Service similar. Experience similar. Price a lot less.
Here is the problem for Southwest and their plan to become a giant ULCC (which is Elliot’s goal). Their costs are far in excess of the Spirits and Frontiers and Breezes.
Especially if a couple of these guys merge and get some scales of economy, SW is in trouble.
Here is a crazy thought. What about a merger of WN and B6?
The big obstacle to this potential merger is the lack of fleet commonality. WN is Boeing and B6 is Airbus. Also the hubs of both are rather close to each other with WN at BWI and B6 at both JFK and BOS. I could see a tie up with AS before B6 since AS and WN have similar 737 fleets.
The only way a WN & AS would happen from AS’s perspective, is if AS is the surviving carrier, which WN doesn’t want. And TBH, I don’t think AS would want to deal with such a huge airline with so many issues, AS is a tightly run ship.
As for the AS being a 737 only carrier, that really isn’t true, and never has been. Before the HA acquisition Alaska Air Group had 737s & E175s. They’ve had a bunch of types over the years, but in the last twenty, they’ve had 737s, E175s, Q400s, Q200s, A319/A320/A321s, CRJ700s, and MD-80s.
After the HA acquisition, AAG has 737s, 717s, A321s, A330s, 787s, and E175s.
The “they’re both 737 operators” line is old, and incorrect.
CF,
Doesn’t SWA have a different cockpit configuration than other 737 operators? Less automation?
Angry Bob – I thought they finally stopped that when they retired the Classics. Pretty sure they have a normal, modern cockpit now, at least on the MAXs.
Art – This is not an issue. If the fleets are big enough, Southwest isn’t going to mind adding a new one. Everything is on the table now.
For once, I can’t agree. Fleet commonality is a big cost differentiator. As long as WN keeps using 737’s they will have an edge, slim though it will be, over most of the others, but especially AA/DL & UA.
Thanks for your great blog!
ejwpj – Time will tell, but Southwest is hamstrung with the 737. With Airbus, it can get a bigger, more efficient airplane. If the fleets are big enough then it’s not really a big issue.
Southwest + Breeze – what goes around comes around.
A Southwest/JetBlue merger would likely add a lot of value to both airlines, because the route maps are very complimentary.
At the same time, it’s very unlikely to happen, because antitrust approval for such a large merger is too unpredictable. The evidence of consumer harm would likely be strong than in the JetBlue/Spirit merger, which was blocked. Even though the new administration is “pro business” in general terms, actual policy is likely to continue to be very unpredictable.
An attempted merger locks up executive attention and limits strategic options for 12-18 months, so a failed merger is very costly. They’re not going to roll the dice.
Breeze might be small enough for them to take a shot at, though.
I think a WN/B6 merger would have a good chance of regulatory approval, at least with the new administration.
They might have to give up a few slots at LGA, but not that much – even combined they’d still be behind DL and AA, and they only overlap on one route: MCO (seasonally.) Overlap is even minimal at DCA (FLL and MCO) but they might have to give up a few slots on overall market share. Beyond that, not much to worry about, maybe a few gates here and there, maybe FLL since it’s pretty full.
The biggest “consumer harm” argument in B6/NK was specific to that transaction removing a ULCC and the specific harm that could come from that and the probability that B6 would have closed some of NK’s routes. That’s not the case here.
Definitely not a slam-dunk, overall domestic market share is still a concern, but possible. Desirable? That’s questionable.
I try not to speculate on mergers, but I very much agree with your take.
Like you, I doubt it will happen (and I’m not saying it “should” or “should not” happen, strategically or operationally, for either airline), but I could see how a potential Southwest/JetBlue merger would likely pass muster with the current administration. In terms of areas of geographical strength, WN & B6 really don’t have that much overlap.
I like to look at the legal aspects of mergers, in my Econ coursework we spent a lot of time on the theoretical basis of antitrust law vs. practical application. Beyond that, other than a few thoughts on fleet compatibility and whether or not it matters in a specific merger it really gets to pure speculation, unless the “merger” is actually an acquisition and the acquirer talks too much.
That’s one (of many) mistakes B6 made with NK, they made it very clear that they would start stripping NK for pilots and (reconfigured) planes and closing NK routes (and even markets), which fed into the judge’s “it makes an LCC go away” mentality.
In a WN/B6 merger, 737 vs A320 wouldn’t matter because of the size of JetBlue’s fleet, the A320 fleet is big enough to be worth the effort. There is an argument that WN as-is shouldn’t add A320s and just buy more 737s because the initial introduction and an initially very small A320 fleet would be expensive, but people sometimes conflate the two issues. And in a WN/B6 merger, WN would get enough A220s from day one to get the benefits of the smaller plane without the introduction hassles.
(Of course, there’s also an argument that WN should add A320s anyway because Boeing can’t seem to reliably put together Lego sets these days, much less deliver planes on time and get new variants certified. But that’s another discussion.)
the Alaska/SAN thing is very interesting imo- when the company acquired VX they got distracted focusing on LAX and SFO, both cities where the Alaska brand is less likely to “work”. But AS has consistently found success in smaller California cities (just look at STS!). I think the brand could be very successful in SAN and SMF as well. They still lack market utility in San Diego to some extent (no DEN or ORD flight) but those are easier holes to plug whereas WN would need smaller gauge aircraft to match Alaska’s flights to places like SBP, MRY, RDM, JAC, etc…
Your thoughts on DEN as a WN market are interesting, Cranky, and dovetails somewhat with an article that ran in the Denver Post a few weeks ago indicating that WN intended to cut the number of flights by around ~5%, but up-gauge aircraft to keep total seats mostly stable:
https://www.denverpost.com/2025/02/25/denver-airport-southwest-airlines-flight-reductions-larger-planes/
So they clearly see a need to start monkeying with the market, perhaps as a result of accepting that their long war of attrition with United is not necessarily bearing fruit.
I don’t see them going into McKinney, since the Wright Amendment repeal has a clause that if they start service at any airport within 80 miles of DAL or DFW, they have to give up gates at DAL
KeepDFWStrong – Nope, that expires this year, and then it’s free to move on.
Cranky, does this also apply to WN possibly going into Meacham? Or were they free to do that already?
Reportedly, an ULCC or two kicked the tires at Meacham a few years ago, but there’s no passenger terminal available. Having a Big Domestic Four carrier show some interest could move the needle on that a bit, perhaps?
(Or perhaps not, pure speculation here. But stranger things have happened.)
CraigTPA – Yep, I believe it included any airport in the Metroplex.
WN has a great position at DAL, but it giveth and it taketh away. They control the airport, with almost all gates (especially since AS bailed).
But it’s limited by law to 20 gates. And even when the Wright Amendment expires this year, there is no appetite in Dallas to expand the terminal.
So this protects their hold on the airport, and blocks other entries…but also doesn’t allow any expansion.
It’s been mentioned in another comment, but I’m really interested what other airlines will do in response to WN’s new lack of product differentiation. I’d be interested in reading your take on that CF.
Does UA try to run them out of DEN?
Does AS try to make a stronger play for California?
What other weaknesses are there? Maybe UA addresses its perpetual lack of a southeast hub by building Nashville up into one, and driving WN out?
I’m curious how much the legacy four see blood in the water and are willing to pounce?
The biggest thing holding them back might be the lack of available aircraft, but there might even be flexibility there by delaying retirements as new planes come onboard.
Nick – I would imagine that the airlines will try to run them out of places where they are competitive, but I don’t think it’s likely we’ll see any airline try to move into Southwest strongholds to try to win. That’s a losing proposition.
I disagree about strategy at SAN.
In the short-term, I agree that it might make sense to draw down service somewhat, and cut down to the most profitable routes.
At the same time, you have to remember that Southwest is playing a “repeated game” with all of its competitors. If they demonstrate that AS can successfully take share at SAN without facing substantial retaliation, then that sends a message to every airline that “Southwest’s bases are open for business”. If you think that Southwest isn’t going to retaliate with a fare war, then it starts to look pretty attractive to build up at BNA, LAS, or maybe even BWI. Airlines know this, and are willing to defend their hubs far more than appears “economically rational” in the short-term. Look at what has happened to every airline that has tried to build up a lower-cost alternative to Delta in Atlanta.
Along the theme of going back to their roots, let’s look at New England for a moment. WN initially hopped into PVD (as an alternative to the more expensive BOS) and gobbled up market share. WN liked that so much that they then went into MHT (bracketing BOS from the north too) and singlehandedly expanded that airport like crazy. The fares were competitive, the pax avoided horrible Boston traffic (which can be epic) on the way to the worst-sited airport in the USA. It was great. Much like what you see in SoCal with LGB, BUR, ONT, SNA.
Eventually, WN got stars in it’s eyes and decided to cut back mightily at both smaller airports (where they were beloved) and expand instead in BOS. That worked for a little while, but at this point Delta and JetBlue are slaughtering them. Meanwhile, upstarts like Breeze and Avelo are sneaking into those gates that WN once abandoned. This scenario has repeated itself elsewhere. Some markets just aren’t in the cards for WN. They need to play to their strengths. Having Wall Street DBs running the show doesn’t help, as said Wall Street DBs wouldn’t have ever been seen on a WN flight in the past anyway.
In terms of location, I’d disagree that BOS is extremely poorly sited, even if it’s not the most convenient for those in the suburbs. It’s geographically much closer to the city center than airports in many other cities of similar sizes, and while the roads around BOS aren’t the best, they could be worse and aren’t too bad given the age of the city compared to most cities.
I haven’t done the analysis on it, but BOS seems to have enough competition from ULCCs these days to keep fares on leisure routes somewhat reasonable & honest, and gone are the days in which MHT & PVD were the main options in the area for cheaper leisure flights.
Yes, Breeze/Avelo/Allegiant are nibbling at the edges at places like Portsmouth (PSM) and Manchester (MHT), but Spirit, Frontier, Southwest, & Allegiant all fly from BOS, and nonstops are from BOS are often priced at or below similar flights from smaller airports.
Boston area traffic sucks and can be super variable, but the bus services to Logan help a LOT with that. From NH, there’s hourly direct bus service to Logan down I-93, I-95 (including a stop a few minutes away from PSM), and Rt 3, with reasonable bus fares & parking costs ($20ish each way for the bus fare, vs ~$50/day on-airport parking at Logan or ~$20/day off-airport parking; parking at the bus service lots is free or a few bucks a day), plus even more frequent service (via Logan Express) from Woburn & Danvers in the Massachusetts suburbs for those closer to the NH/MA border.
This is an argument I heard all the time when I lived in the region: BOS is great because it’s so close to downtown! Nonsense; it’s absolutely awful from any of the suburbs (except maybe Winthrop). The population of greater Boston is 4,920,000….the population of Boston proper is 652,000. Of all metro areas in the US, Boston is one of the most overwhelmingly suburban. And, the more affluent people (aside from the tiny % who live in Brookline or on Beacon Hill) who tend to fly also tend to live well west/northwest/southwest and north of the city. So, BOS is awesome for maybe 10% (?) of the market. And it totally sucks to get to for the majority, not to mention that the traffic even on the airport grounds is epic. MHT and PVD are pain free and nice smaller airports and WN had a great niche there. Sure, we all knew that a trip to Logan was necessary to go to London or Paris or Sao Paolo – but it was great to be able to fly to St. Louis or Dallas or even Phoenix from one of these convenient options. WN took that advantage they had off the table.
Strictly speculation, but a smaller mainline feeder jet size seems inevitable to bolster hub feed from smallee markets OR they will be trying to cut to profitability. They can always call J Smisek in to help with that project.
Oh my, don’t fly WN often, but after what J SMI did to UA, he just needs to stay away from all airlines, I’d never fly on one where he has any say.
I just can’t see Elliot investing a dime in new equipment much less a merger…unless WN is the acquired and they walk away with the bag.
RE: back to the future flying. Yes, there’re lots of dots that can survive on local demand alone. IIRC WN leadership said they were trimming them because operating costs were too high. And that was before the new crew contracts were ratified.
An interesting experiment will be to see how this close in Nashville flying goes.
“The question is whether it grows into other airports. I can see something like McKinney to the northeast of town, but I have a hard time thinking DFW is going to work when American flies to so many more destinations with so much more frequency.”
FWIW, WN allegedly had a deal with DFW to begin service there once the new Terminal F opens, but who knows if that’s still on the table. TKI is the more interesting angle to me, though. There is some drama, as the city council wants commercial service, but there’s also some NIMBY opposition that’s trying to stop it from happening. Last I heard, the commercial terminal would be 5 gates max, so not a ton of room in any case.
Southwest will not be getting into terminal F.
What they are building right now is only 15 gates, and worse than that, there is no counter space that is going to be there. It’s basically just going to be a remote concourse that you have to ride the sky link from.
According to DFW passengers will check in in terminal E and then ride the train.
They are adding I think 10 or 20 more gates to terminal C, but those will go to American.
While WN are being brave, I think it’s a strong possibility they will pursue a takeover of Jetblue…
Very complementary networks and a way to get into A220 flying (correcting the mistake they made choosing the 737-7 instead).
Now will WN finally pull out of ORD and when or will they stick it out using T5’s Common Use Gates
In terms of traffic, Boston area traffic isn’t great, but the drive times to Logan aren’t insane compared to those to airports in many other metro areas of similar sizes, even from points located very close to MHT & PSM.
As an example, North Londonderry, NH is a 45 mile drive from the city of Boston itself, 48 miles away from Logan (and not even considered part of the Boston metro area proper, though plenty of people commute from there), so it’s not close to Logan at all by most standards. Despite that, between Logan & Exit 5 on I-93 in North Londonderry, the Boston Express bus service btimetable shows direct service to Logan in 60 minutes most of the time, rising to 75 minutes during peak rush hour. Those times are reasonable and realistic, based on both my experience and on Google Maps. Would MHT be far more convenient and preferred? Absolutely, that Exit 5 bus station is only 12 minutes away from MHT. However, other large metro areas have plenty of sections that are similarly 60-75 minutes from the main airport, so (again, even for this more extreme example) Logan isn’t horrible. On I-95, there’s another service that runs similar transit times from Seabrook, NH (with originating service in Portsmouth, very close to PSM) to Logan in about an hour.
I don’t think you can judge things just by the population within the city boundaries; Cambridge & Somersville are very urban, and some of the cities in the area have population densities that meet or exceed those of Boston; remember that many of the inner “surburbs” have a lot of very densely packed row houses and similar from 100+ years ago (depressing to look at). Somersville has ~50% more people per square mile of land than Boston itself, Chelsea & Cambridge are also significantly more densely populated than Boston, and Everett, Malden, & Lawrence are similar. (Source: https://statisticalatlas.com/metro-area/Massachusetts/Boston/Population)
When you think about business travel demand for bigger companies, Boston itself and nearby cities like Cambridge & Somersville, have some major corporate offices, and many others are located in/near the 128/I-95 inner loop. For those areas, Logan is still usually going to be quicker in terms of travel time than PVD or MHT.
As a flier in the area, I would love to have more options out of MHT or PSM (Portsmouth). Both are convenient and easy, but there just aren’t many nonstops from those airports, and I don’t think that many people who live much north of 128 really even consider MHT or PSM, while Logan is still not that bad even for those closer to MHT and RI. Ultimately, given the travel time to Logan, at the moment it seems that MHT, PSM, & PVD are a little too far out to really be that convenient for enough people to drive more critical mass outside of some flights to hubs and a few VFR destinations.