The Unexpected Rebirth of United’s Narita Hub

United

In 1986, United Airlines took over Pan Am’s Pacific route network. This was arguably the beginning of the end for Pan Am, but it’s also what brought United into the big leagues as a true international carrier. At the heart of this deal was the acquisition of the Tokyo/Narita hub, something that seemed just a few years ago to be gone for good. With last week’s summer 2025 route announcement, however, the Narita hub is back.

The Tokyo hub might be considered one of the spoils of war. Pan Am and Northwest received the right to fly not only from Tokyo to the US but also beyond into Asia. Not only could they fly the routes, but they could carry local traffic on them as the primary carriers in the country in the wake of World War II.

Delta, of course, bought Northwest, but it has given up on that Tokyo hub completely in favor of its Incheon partnership in South Korea. It’s United’s hub that is far more interesting.

In 1986 when United took over from Pan Am, it was flying from Tokyo to Beijing, Hong Kong, Manila, Seoul, Shanghai, and Taipei. Over the years, the aircraft and destinations changed, but the sentiment stayed the same. By 2000, all of those cities were still served except for Taipei which was replaced by Singapore.

Back in the Pan Am days, the Tokyo hub was crucial. Aircraft couldn’t make it all the way to these destinations nonstop from the US, so a stop where an airline could carry local traffic was a gift. Over time, of course, aircraft got longer legs and that stop became less necessary. But the hub stuck around in one form or another to continue to serve the dwindling needs of travelers.

Beijing went away as an every-day option in 2004, but it was 2011 when things got really dire. That’s when United entered into a joint venture with ANA. This meant United didn’t need to fly beyond Tokyo, because ANA could carry those passengers more efficiently. The revenue split made it more attractive.

Taipei service ended in 2012. Hong Kong was gone for good in 2013. Singapore made it until 2016. The final straw was in October 2017 when the last Incheon flight operated.

It certainly didn’t help that Japan decided to open up the close-in Haneda Airport for international flights once again. That hadn’t happened since the new Narita airport opened in 1978. United got its first slot in 2014 which it flew from San Francisco. Airlines jumped at the chance to move to Haneda, because, well, you know….

As more flights moved from Narita to Haneda, the potential feed at Narita shrunk. Narita was written off as a mere low-cost airline airport that would make a living serving leisure destinations.

But Haneda couldn’t ever grow enough to carry all the capacity the capital needed. United continues to fly to Narita from Denver, Houston, IAH, Los Angeles, Newark, and San Francisco. ANA does Chicago/O’Hare, Honolulu, Los Angeles, and San Francisco in the US.

This story probably would have ended here were it not for the Continental merger back in 2010. See, in 1968 Continental started up Air Micronesia to serve the needs of the US’s westernmost territory, primarily via Guam and Saipan. That operation built up into something pretty massive.

There was the 767 (later 777) that brought people from Honolulu to Guam and sometimes on to Tokyo. Then there was the famed Island Hopper that went along all the little atolls and islands between Honolulu and Guam, the equivalent of taking the local bus with multiple stops.

But the biggest part of that operation was Japan. By the middle of 2006, Continental had flights from Guam and Saipan to nine Japanese cities, not to mention all the other places around the Pacific, even including Cairns in Australia.

While Guam was further than you might have thought from Honolulu, it was close to Asia. The flight from Guam to Narita was just a bit shorter than Los Angeles to St Louis. That means within the Guam network, the 737 ruled.

When the airlines came together, the then-named Continental Micronesia was folded into United, but the crew base and separate aircraft base remained. It wasn’t until after the pandemic that United realized it could be sitting on a real opportunity here.

United didn’t need to serve the big cities of Bangkok and Singapore or Seoul and Beijing. It had ANA to provide that feed. But there were a lot of secondary cities in Asia that ANA didn’t serve. If United could somehow make its 737s float between a Guam and Tokyo hub, it could improve utilization and grow the Asian network for the two airlines.

The first attempt to dip its toe into this market was Cebu. The flight from Narita to Cebu starts this month on a Guam-based 737-800. The market is unserved by ANA.

Just last week, United announced a trio of new flights. Palau, a market Delta served until 2018, will join the network as will Kaohsiung in Taiwan and Ulaanbataar in Mongolia. All of these routes are less than 2,000 miles… an easy jaunt for the 737.

But most importantly none of these markets are served by ANA, nor are they served by rival Japan Airlines. Kaohsiung and Palau aren’t served by Korean via Incheon either. United is creating connectivity that just doesn’t easily exist on other airlines, stretching its international network to reach new spots that most other US carriers wouldn’t ever even consider.

This is about United taking advantage of its strengths. It has big hubs in the biggest cities. If anyone can make some of these further-afield destinations work, it’s probably United. At the same time, it has this Guam operation which is very unique and can turn into a real Asian advantage.

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50 comments on “The Unexpected Rebirth of United’s Narita Hub

  1. It might be also worth noting that they already serve Palau from Guam, with the Koror flights also heading to Manila.

  2. I was excited about these new revival of NRT from UA. However, this bears the question, why is ANA not flying these routes already? Without knowing better, I would assume UA has higher cost than ANA (when flying from NRT). It is likely a fleet thing as ANA doesn’t have a massive narrow body fleet (do they need ETOPS for these routes? Do ANA has ETOPS on the narrow bodies if they are mostly for domestic flights?) Theses routes are not without competition. A quick google flight search indicates MIAT flies NRT-UBN with a JAL codeshare. MIAT seems to charge a premium on this route. Meanwhile NRT-KHH is flown by Thai AirAsia and even this ULCC charges a small premium on this route compared to the much more competitive NRT-TPE route.

    1. Wany – ETOPS is only needed for the Palau flight. The rest are fine. But ANA just doesn’t have that many narrowbodies. Looks like it has around 25 Airbuses (almost all neo) which are entirely domestic except for Beijing and Shanghai. Then there are 39 737-800s which are entirely domestic. (Not including the low cost carriers that operate separately.) So they just aren’t built for this kind of thing.

      And while other airlines may fly this route, this is really more about connectivity into the global network.

  3. United scored a major coup when it acquired Pan Am’s Pacific operation decades ago and got a major advantage in transforming itself into a global carrier compared to AA and DL; all 3 of the current US global megacarriers were predominantly domestic up to that point while international was primarily operated by carriers that are no longer with us.
    The Japanese government’s decision to open Narita and the limits of aircraft range provided ready ingredients for the development of Tokyo as the primary connecting hub to Asia.
    UA’s decision to buy the 744 and later the 777 and its hub at SFO allowed it to push deeper into Asia overflying NRT. NW didn’t have a strong west coast presence and was slow to make a decision on a long range twin so was less capable of serving the rest of Asia beyond Tokyo nonstop from the US.
    DL’s merger with NW came just before the Japanese government started the process to re-open Haneda to US flights; DL’s fight to try to move its NRT hub to HND ended w/ DL’s decision to abandon the beyond Tokyo flying with Delta becoming the largest foreign carrier at HND as it shifted its connecting hub to ICN in partnership with KE.
    S. Korea made the decision like many countries around the world that ICN would be the sole longhaul international airport for Seoul while Japan is still in a transition period with the role of NRT set to become the low cost carrier for Tokyo. Who knows when or if HND will gain enough capacity to replace NRT for international flights but the two Tokyo airport setup is pulling significant amounts of local Tokyo traffic off of US-HND flights.

    UA is also fighting decreased US-Micronesia traffic due to the weak Yen.

    UA’s beyond NRT flights now are on narrowbodies which they can make work because of the GUM pilot base and, so far, with few daily, year-round flights.

    Thus, UA is making the best of a less-than-ideal situation in many regards but they will not return NRT to anywhere close to the position that UA or NW/DL had with a Tokyo hub – and UA does not need to with its nonstops deeper into Asia or DL’s growing presence from the US nonstop to destinations beyond Tokyo and Seoul and its position at ICN with KE where DL will soon have the largest US carrier operation in Asia at a single airport.

    There is only so much that DL and UA can do to serve E. Asia. UA is ahead of DL and has advantages in many regards but DL will have some strengths that UA is not anywhere close to duplicating.

    1. What strengths does DL have, Timbits? Like no wi-fi over the Pacific? Your precious Widget is slumming off of KE at Incheon for what minimal services it has. And what West Coast hub does DL have that would be ideal for these flights? No, SEA doesn’t count.

      Admit it, UA is kicking your boy’s butts in five ways to Sunday, and suck it up, buttercup.

      1. As I have accurately noted, UA’s strength in E. Asia is not in NE Asia where the two are relatively close to parity but in HKG, MNL and SIN which DL does not serve at all as well as UA’s larger position in TPE and serving KIX.
        DL and UA have relatively similarly sized positions in Tokyo, Seoul, and China. DL’s addition of SLC-ICN will allow them to tie their position at HND with the largest number of flights from the US for a US carrier. UA’s position at NRT plus ICN will be comparable to DL at ICN.
        As soon as the KE-OZ merger is approved or even if it is rejected, DL will add even more service to ICN and the A350-1000s will start service adding 25% more capacity (depending on configuration but expected to be 330-350 seats) over every other UA aircraft except the 777-300ER which burns 25% more fuel than the A350-1000.
        DL also says it will use the 35K to push deeper into Asia which undoubtedly means places which UA flies now but DL does not.

        DL was the largest carrier across the Pacific right after the NW merger; they decided the NRT hub didn’t work, Japan opened HND to local traffic, and covid hit and DL decided to retire the 777s but there have been way too many people that assumed that DL would be comfortable only feeding KE at ICN. If UA can make money flying to Asia, DL will add service as well.

        You are free to look down on DL’s gateways to Asia but facts show that DL and UA have gotten pretty comparable average fares for passenger services across the Pacific for years. DL’s hubs are clearly capable of generating the revenue DL needs to compete.

        It will actually be UA that is on the defensive as DL converts the 35Ls to 35Hs and takes delivery of the rest of the 359 order and takes at least 20 35Ks which will be the most efficient large widebody in the US carrier fleet.

        DL plays the long game and runs marathons; UA is into sprints.

        As much as you want to act like DL is incapable of doing it, a look at the Pacific in even 5 years will show that UA’s lead over DL both in terms of revenue and in terms of cities served will be substantially reduced.

        1. “DL plays the long game and runs marathons; UA is into sprints.”

          If that’s the case, then UA is Usain Bolt while DL is the driver of the SUV that has a 26.2 sticker on the back window.

    2. This is so funny because for yeaaaaaaars you would regale everyone how DL was going to own the Pacific with its perennially money losing NRT hub and steal JL from AA and here we are.

  4. This makes sense given UA’s existing assets in the region and is worth a try. HND’s slot constraints don’t allow significant breadth or depth of connectivity beyond TYO. Given that UA/NH still want to make use of US-NRT frequencies due to HND’s limited slots, any attempt to help fill US-NRT flights with niche (and potentially high yielding given the lack of access) traffic beyond NRT would be super helpful. Who knows if it will make money but kudos for the creativity!

    1. very accurate.

      Tokyo from the US is a no-growth market in terms of new flights. NRT flights do not generate anywhere close to the revenue they once did because Tokyo local revenue is bleeding to HND.
      Because of the weak yen/strong dollar, Japan has moved from being a heavily Japan point of origin market to the US to being much more US point of origin. and the US-Japan market is much more seasonal than it was when it was predominantly a Japan point of origin market.

      These new UA flights push a little bit of connecting traffic through NRT but they don’t materially change the dynamics of the US-Japan market.
      UA and AA wanted Open Skies at NRT in order to get JVs with NH and JL but the economics of Tokyo as a connecting hub will be poor because of the split Tokyo airport situation and because other airports in E. Asia are better suited to singularly serve the local US market as well as connections deeper into Asia from the same airport.

      UA does get credit for creativity and putting pieces together that only they could do but that doesn’t mean the economics of their Tokyo service will change much – and that is a key reason why they underperform DL in revenue per ASM across the Pacific while AA simply has been out classed by both DL and UA in E. Asia.

  5. I might be mistaken, but didn’t United serve Tokyo from San Francisco since the end of WWII? Remember reading that somewhere.

    1. UA did not serve Tokyo until the early 80’s when they were awarded SEA/PDX-NRT rights. For many years prior to Deregulation, UA’s only international destinations were YVR and YYZ.

    1. A lot of Pan Am’s history isn’t as glorious as the legends suggest. The YouTube channel “Company Man” gave a complete background & it’s financial struggles in the 70’s that lead to it’s demise a decade & a half later. I believe “Wendover Productions” did something similar as there’s a lot of airline content over there.

    2. The end of the end was not doing the REQUIRED passenger baggage reconciliation on flight 103.

      1. I remember seeing an interview with PanAm’s CEO who said they were having some good turn around numbers right before the 103 bombing, but that killed the airline’s demand.

        Also, wasn’t the positive bag matching requirement a result of 103?

        1. So it less straightforward than I thought. This seems to imply that the ICAO standards came into force in 1987 requiring px baggage reconciliation:

          https://www.tsi-mag.com/thirty-years-of-passenger-baggage-reconciliation-is-it-still-relevant/

          Very interesting article by a guy who was involved at the time, apparently PBR was largely an innovation in the early 80s created by my favorite defunct airline, Eastern, which I did not know before.

          I believe the Air Disasters TV program about Clipper 103 stated that PBR was required but not done but I need to rewatch that to be sure. That is my recollection however.

          1. Bill, thank you for correcting me and the super interesting article.

            I wonder if an airline that wasn’t in such turmoil as PanAm was a contributing factor to not properly implementing the new bag matching requirement.

  6. Is IAD the only hub without a flight to NRT? Currently 2 daily flights to HND, a United 777 and an ANA 787. Would IAD-NRT eventually make sense to leverage this connectivity?

    Speaking of the new connectivity via NRT, I realize this will vary by market but, generally speaking, how much of this traffic do they expect to be from US flight connections compared to O&D?

    Thanks CF, it is always fun to talk about new things in this industry for a change! Especially when I could potentially have one stop service from my house to Mongolia, LOL!

  7. The other factor that dovetails into this is Asiana Airlines, a Star Alliance member in the process of being acquired by Korean Air. It wouldn’t surprise me if United focused on destinations not served by ANA where they used to be able to connect via Asiana and are losing that connection with the merger.

  8. I think there’s a typo. “While Guam was further than you might have thought from Honolulu, it was close to Asia….” I think it should be thought.

  9. If Tokyo – Ulaan Bataar was such a goldmine, why are ANA not flying it already ?

    I get that ANA may have a shortage of 150-200 seat aircraft, but most airlines will happily drop or reduce frequency on a not-very-profitable route if they think an alternate route will be much more profitable. If ANA made some terrible mistake over not ordering enough 150-200 seat aircraft years ago, why are they not buying on the second-hand market or doing (more) dry leases, or even wet leases, over a 3 or 5 year period ?

    JAL can fly Tokyo-Ulaan Bataar as well if they want but instead they codeshare with MIAT Mongolian. No, don’t laugh because it all sounds so foreign and different – laugh only if you have substantive personal experience or knowledge.

    Is the Mongolia-USA market really so huge ? Even bigger than the market between Mongolia and Japan excluding Tokyo ? Can United really outmatch the sales -and-marketing reach of ANA within domestic Japan on this ? I just can’t see what magic wand United has that ANA and JAL cannot readily obtain if they want

    1. I think UA is playing Costco’s marketing game: what you see may or may not be here next week, so if you like it you better stock up (or fly) now. UA releases a bunch of obscure, exotic new destinations each year which may or may not last. And there is so much wealth ($+miles/points) in America looking for cool new places to go (and Instagram, lol), they jump on them, especially if they’re not sure the destination will last more than a season. It’s honestly brilliant. Routes don’t have to be permanently viable – just serve a surge of temporary demand then redeploy the planes.

      As far as Tim’s point about the HND and NRT split weakening the connections, someone will have to explain to me how 37m people in Tokyo can’t keep two airports vibrant when 19 million people in NYC (half as many!) keep 3 airports fully throttled? Seoul may only have one main intl airport, but it has about a quarter the population of Tokyo. It seems to me anything DL+KE can do at ICN, UA + ANA can definitely support at NRT.

      1. Good point about NY, but the population of the Seoul metro area (Seoul city + surrounding Gyeonggi province) is about 26m – 2/3 that of Tokyo.

        1. Seoul also has two airports with most of the international at Incheon and most of the domestic at closer Gimpo. Very analogous to Tokyo.

      2. The reason both Tokyo airports cannot serve what JFK and EWR do for NYC is because of the limitations on both HND and NRT.

        EWR and JFK both work because both are large enough – or push enough flights through them even if they have poor operational performance as airports – to make viable global hubs. And the same airlines do not hub at both EWR and JFK.

        Let me know what airlines have GLOBAL hubs at two different airports in the same city as NH and JL are trying to do. I don’t think the list will be very long.

        HND has lots of domestic service but not much international service relative to NRT. NRT has more international service but is losing local Tokyo market revenue because HND gets the best revenue.

        The Tokyo dual hub strategy doesn’t work; NH/UA and JL/AA have to keep trying to make it work because that is the best option they have and their JVs are based on the NRT hub.
        ICN is a much larger global hub as is HKG and other cities along the Pacific Rim in E. Asia.

        and, yes UA can keep cycling destinations through NRT but seasonal, less than daily markets aren’t going to dramatically change the trajectory of NRT. And as others have noted, if these destinations are great destinations, NH would have served them earlier and would serve them more than UA is proposing to do.

        and the Seoul metro area makes up a higher percentage of S. Korea than Tokyo does of Japan. Korean and Asiana do not have to commit as many resources to the domestic market. KE and OZ do serve more of the Japan-S. Korea market than Japanese airlines do because Japan is about the only foreign country that has service from Gimpo while KE and OZ serve many Japanese cities to ICN for connections.

        and if the KE-OZ merger is approved, KE will likely consolidate some competing KE and OZ S. Korea-Japan flights on larger aircraft while adding even more international destinations.

        Pacific aviation is in flux on both sides of the Pacific. DL and KE are both going to grow more at ICN than UA and NH are at Tokyo.

        1. “Pacific aviation is in flux on both sides of the Pacific. DL and KE are both going to grow more at ICN than UA and NH are at Tokyo.”

          That I believe, because DL doesn’t have a real west coast hub like UA does at SFO to carry most of the load to Asia. No matter what DL tries to do at SEA, it will be forced to pump most Asia traffic thru ICN.

          1. Tory,
            we ALL get that UA built the largest transpacific hub at SFO.
            But there are far too many of you that think that no one else can compete and you believe that because DL essentially sat out the last 5 years between the closure of the NRT hub and now- which coincides when DL said from during the pandemic when it believed international travel would return to pre-covid levels – and it built its fleet plan around that prediction.
            In some respects, DL was too conservative about the return of international demand but one year or 18 months is not going to make a difference in the scope of a decades long restructuring of the Pacific – which is what DL is doing.
            As hard as it is for you or others to admit, if UA can make money flying the Pacific, DL can too and can do it through other hubs. When you add in the increased range, size and efficiency of the A350 fleet, DL will have advantages that UA itself cannot match.

            let’s remember also that DL has more flights to E. Asia just from ATL and DTW than UA has from every other city to E. Asia outside of California.

            The size of UA’s Asian network is driven by SFO in the US and its service to HKG and south in E. Asia but neither of those advantages are insurmountable except in the minds of people that want to believe that UA cannot be touched.

            UA’s addition of NRT and beyond service on narrowbodies is creative but it simply won’t make any significant difference in the size of UA relative to DL or AA. It simply adds a few more dots to the route map and not even all for the whole year.

    2. Anon – I don’t think that’s the right way to look at this. United has a fleet of aircraft based in Guam with crews that aren’t going away. So, if you have the airplanes and crews, what’s the best way to improve performance? These are the kinds of routes that can work. That doesn’t suggest that places like Ulaanbataar are so good that ANA should pull 737s away from its lucrative domestic market. It’s an unknown. But for United to try to thread the needle and make money by improving utilization and adding value to both airlines is sensible.

  10. On Twitter Jason Rabinowitz posted that “United is (or will be) the new Delta.”

    He framed it as a hot take, but I think it’s dead on.

    1. interesting take for sure.

      Since UA has copied most of DL’s strategies other than network and DL is copying UA’s strategies, it will all be interesting to watch.

      DL still generates more passenger revenue overall because of much larger domestic revenues than UA gets in extra international revenues.

      And, I don’t think DL will be rehubbing NRT while UA is doing round two of that strategy.

      Competition is good; so glad that we still have it in the US airline industry

      1. Tim, I enjoy reading your comments. We all know that you have a particular favorite airline. Just a question, have you ever thought about taking a break?

        1. I do take breaks… had a lovely weekend.

          I participate in social media for the same reason other people do – for entertainment and exchanging ideas. and perspective.
          Not everything resonates.

          Regarding UA and its NRT rehub notions, Ken’s perspective below is not far from where I am…. not all wine does well in new wineskins.

          I have simply noted that UA is trying to make the best of a less-than-ideal situation on multiple fronts but haven’t really changed the overall direction or their or anyone else’s position in Asia or Europe even with their announcement of a bunch of narrowbody, less than daily, largely seasonal flight additions.
          They did add some off-the-wall new dots to a US airline route maps for those that find that sort of accomplishment as noteworthy.

          psst… they report their 3rd quarter earnings in a couple hours and will hopefully provide updated guidance and MAYBE some news on when their flight attendants will get a new contract – at the cost of future earnings – since UA is the last of the big 4 to share their new found increased income w/ ALL of their employees.

  11. Well regarding UA and the NRT hub. What’s new is old and what’s old is new. They are putting old wine in new bottles. I have to congratulate UA for creative ways to use the GUM hub. If the hub is struggling, at least they aren’t dumping it all together. There are always skeptical people regarding UA’s moves. But they are forgetting one large thing. UA is good at keeping new adds. The only city that they dumped soon was Bergen.

  12. Just reposting hoping my friend Cranky will see it:

    Is IAD the only hub without a flight to NRT? Currently 2 daily flights to HND, a United 777 and an ANA 787. Would IAD-NRT eventually make sense to leverage this connectivity?

    Speaking of the new connectivity via NRT, I realize this will vary by market but, generally speaking, how much of this traffic do they expect to be from US flight connections compared to O&D?

    1. Bill – If you count UA flights only, then Chicago and Dulles are the two without. But Chicago has a Narita flight on ANA and Dulles does not.
      Whether it will someday justify a Narita flight, I have no idea.

      As for how much connecting traffic they expect, I could not tell you.
      That’s a questino for United.

  13. UA execs had some interesting comments about Asia/Pacific and fleet on their earnings call yesterday, including that their aggressive post-covid growth in the region is over and they will be returning to normal growth rates. They say that China loads are not where they want and they are not likely to be adding much else and also see fare weakness in the S. Pacific.

    While not said, ultimately if the GUM hub is weak, they will shift aircraft back to the mainland where they can undoubtedly fly more and generate more revenue.

    They were asked if they still expect the large fleet expenditures which they planned for but are not happening and they said they are ready for it but are comfortable that rate of growth will not come.
    Their investor guidance shows only 3 787 deliveries this year and only 5 MAXs in the 4th quarter with 14 321NEOs expected.
    They aren’t planning to retire any aircraft in the 4th quarter and only retired 10 319/20s earlier this year so their fleet age will grow with a mainline increase of just 41 aircraft in 2024

  14. Okay. I know I should already know the answer, but what does Godzilla have to do with the two Tokyo airports?

    1. Gammyjill – It’s a long-running joke from when I first put up the map in this post showing how Godzilla’s home is in between Narita and Tokyo, and that’s why Haneda is so much better as a local airport. It was a dumb joke that got legs of its own.

      1. Thanks for explaining, Cranky. That’s what I figured it was. I was a travel agent back in the 1980s and 1990’s and remember all the hubbub of Narita being built and opening. I think there was a lot of controversy about expropriation of land for the airport.

        Isn’t there a golf course in the middle of the runway complex? Or was that Mirabel?

        1. There are golf courses all around Narita, but not in the middle of it. I think the issue there was more with a farmer.

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