Fares Have Been Primed to Rise, Airlines Are Finally Making It Happen


Earnings season has officially begun with, as always, Delta kicking off festivities late last week and then United just yesterday releasing its numbers. The airlines unsurprisingly did very well, but the results and more importantly, forward-looking guidance, show that we may have finally seen a structural shift. Airfares are up, and I don’t imagine they’ll be going back down anytime soon.

On the surface, it looks like Delta is outperforming with an operating margin of 9.4 percent versus United’s 6.2 percent, but remember, Delta owns a refinery and that helped boost the company’s fortunes this quarter. Since today’s topic is about the core business, let’s try and strip out fuel’s impact.

  • Excluding the refinery, Delta’s operating revenues were up 13.9 percent, below United’s 16.0 percent
  • Fuel expense at Delta rose 67.2 percent year-over-year while United was up 84.1 percent
  • Fuel went from being worth 55.8 percent of Delta’s largest expense — total salaries and wages expense — to 86.3 percent, but at United fuel soared to become the airline’s number one cost at 109 percent of salaries and wages
  • Delta’s unit costs were up 21.4 percent, but excluding fuel, they were up only 6.8 percent while United’s numbers were up 15.2 and 6.1 percent respectively

You get it. Fuel is a big deal, and it was very messy in Q2 when the bulk of the Iran War was being waged. And yes, I’m well aware that it’s still being waged and probably won’t end anytime soon now that Iran has learned it can toy with the Strait of Hormuz whenever it feels like it. Just look at the downward slope reversing course recently.

via IATA

And when fuel goes up, fares have to go up. In the past, this often meant cutting significant capacity thanks to basic economics, but that’s not happening now. And even when fuel came down off its highs, fares didn’t budge downward at all. Demand has been very strong, and it took an event like this to get airlines to actually be able to take real pricing increases for the first time in a long time.

To see what I mean, you can look at the Government Accountability Office’s new report on the impact of mergers. I sat with Courtney Miller as my guest host on The Air Show this week to talk about that report in detail. I won’t get into those details here, because it frankly isn’t helpful to this discussion since the study period stopped in 2024. This just provides the historical context that fares have been going down for quite some time. In other words, while this consolidated industry structure has been in the works for a couple decades, the airlines really didn’t significantly flex their pricing muscles until recently.


The Air Show

The Air Show

A podcast about the business of the sky

Listen on Spotify   |   Listen on Apple Podcasts


There’s no question that consolidation made this possible, and sometimes in ways you might not imagine. For example, airline pricing teams are better at their jobs simply because there are fewer of them out there. The ones that remain tend to be much better at the job at hand. The reason this is so important for gaining pricing power is that one airline has historically been able to tank a fare initiative pretty easily, even something as simple as a small, across-the-board fare increase. Today, we aren’t seeing that.

Let’s get back to Delta’s results — I can’t do this with United yet since the 10-Q wasn’t out at the time of publication. Strip out things like loyalty revenues (which always seems to go up these days) and look at just Delta’s Q2 ticket revenue, and we see it increased 12.5 percent year-over-year. The reality is that fares went up much more than that, because a decent chunk of Q2 bookings happened before the recent run-up. But even 12.5 percent is a remarkable increase considering that capacity was flat.

This doesn’t look like a temporary blip, even though we know everything in this industry is somewhat temporary. Just look at Delta which reaffirmed its earnings guidance for the full year and United which improved it. They won’t be the only ones. It’s easy to say this is all due to that growing pot of credit card money or refinery earnings or something else, and yes, those all help. But the reality is that none of this happens without the industry’s main players all realizing that there is room for higher fares. Even if that weren’t the case, it has become easier for airlines to insulate themselves from low-cost airline fare actions, something that has always been a problem.

Pricing is far more complex than it was in the past, so there are more levers to pull. If Frontier decided it wanted a massive sale since its results are not great, the other airlines could match with Basic Economy fares only and not see their entire fare structure collapse. The ability to better segment means that fare actions can be compartmentalized.

The airlines love segmentation so much that it continues to spread. Delta is now introducing Basic Business — or as I like to call it, Delta None — which will undoubtedly keep the same pricing business class has today, simply creating an upsell for those who want a seat assignment in advance along with other goodies. It’s a straight-up fare increase that others likely can’t torpedo. (United has already gone down this path anyway.)

All this being said, fare increases don’t work in a vacuum. Capacity levels are very important, and the industry has seen capacity decline dramatically very recently. Spirit finally went away in Q2 after being unsustainable as a business for a couple of years. This takes away one more desperate management team and further consolidates the industry into something more rational.

This doesn’t mean that fares will only go up from now on. There will be a recession. There will be downturns. Maybe there will even be a well-funded startup, though that doesn’t seem very likely today. We don’t know when, but when this happens, fares will fall. But instead of plunging, airlines will better manage their capacity and keep pricing at a higher level.

This is exactly the kind of thing former American CEO Doug Parker meant when he said the industry wouldn’t lose money again. It was a tone-deaf statement that didn’t land with employees, but it also didn’t prove to be strictly true. Of course, he wasn’t thinking about a global pandemic when he said it; he was talking about normal economic cycles. And he was right. The thing is, the big airlines hadn’t really been willing to test it out until this year once it was pretty clear they had largely vanquished the low-cost carrier threat.

Admittedly, we haven’t seen this tested in any significant way since the pandemic ended. Only time will tell if this is right or not, but the fact that airlines are pushing fares higher and not seeing much blowback means they will be emboldened to keep trying to push the envelope. Now the only real question is whether the government will eventually decide this is an antitrust issue that it needs to revisit.

Get Cranky in Your Inbox!

The airline industry moves fast. Sign up and get every Cranky post in your inbox for free.

Brett Avatar

27 responses to “Fares Have Been Primed to Rise, Airlines Are Finally Making It Happen”

  1. Angry Bob Crandall Avatar
    Angry Bob Crandall

    Maybe airlines like segmentation but us travelers don’t! Airlines have turned booking into a maze of artificial fences: Basic Economy vs. Main Cabin vs. “Main Plus” vs. Premium Economy, each stripping out or adding back things like seat selection, carry-on bags, boarding order, and changeability. The segmentation isn’t designed around what customers actually need, it’s designed to make the advertised fare look low while pushing you to upgrade out of fear (“no refunds, no seat, board last, middle seat guaranteed”).

    A few things make it especially bad:
    1. The unbundling is deliberately confusing. You can’t easily compare total cost across airlines because each one bundles differently. A $180 Basic Economy fare on one carrier might cost more than a $220 standard fare elsewhere once you add a bag and a seat.
    2. The names are meaningless. “Economy Flex,” “Comfort+,” “Preferred,” “Main Select” ; none of these tell you what you’re getting. You have to expand a comparison table on every single search.
    3. The penalties are asymmetric. The cheap tiers exist mostly to punish you if anything changes, no rebooking, no credit, sometimes not even overhead bin access which turns a $40 savings into a bet against your own life circumstances. It hits infrequent travelers hardest. Frequent flyers know the traps; someone booking one trip a year gets burned by fine print they had no reason to expect.

    The frustrating part is that it works financially. Fare segmentation and ancillary fees are billions in revenue, so there’s little incentive to simplify.

    1. SEAN Avatar
      SEAN

      You’re right Angry Bob with fare segmentation. I’ll add one more thing, if the ME war continues long enough oil availability will constrict causing prices to skyrocket. We already know the straight is closed& will remain so until the US & Israel withdraw from the region.

    2. abcdefg Avatar
      abcdefg

      Strong disagreement. Customers have different needs when they travel. If you don’t travel much, and don’t care where you sit and don’t care about checking a bag, Basic Economy is the product for you.

      I understand there is a lot of detail to read through to understand what you’re buying which is a big lift to the infrequent traveler, but I can’t fathom airlines colluding to align their brands and product combos, which is what that is suggesting. Each fast food chain which sells hamburgers brands theirs differently and has slightly different specifics on the product. Yes the concept of refundability doesn’t exist elsewhere, but when you’re buying a contract to travel there is nothing wrong with there being a higher price to obtain improved contract terms.

      I struggle to imagine further segmentation due to the complexity implications (other than truly new onboard products like the SkyCouch or Polaris Studio I think UA calls it).

    3. Mark Avatar
      Mark

      On the other side of the coin, customers don’t mind if the airlines have predictable periods of financial losses, but the airlines sure do.

      Keep in mind that the relatively low profit margins for the industry (when they exist at all) need to provide the significant amounts of capital needed to invest in new planes, new technology, new products, employee salaries, airport leases and operating costs, maintenance upkeep of the planes, fuel, etc.

      So if the airlines need to do something that helps them make those investments for customers and employees, I think we can cut them some slack.

      1. BruceC Avatar
        BruceC

        The airlines make virtually no (or very little) money flying passengers. Credit cards are their savior which is a big reason why the ULCC’s are faring much worse in these times. They don’t have the massive cash infusion from AMEX, Chase etc. All Frontier (for example) has been able to do are sale/leasebacks to generate cash.

        1. Mark Avatar
          Mark

          True. Even more reason to not judge harshly when airlines do something to raise revenue.

  2. 1990 Avatar
    1990

    At this rate, might as well just adopt the La Compagnie-model of all-business-class aircraft, because the middle and bottom segments of this market are dropping out, fast, and it’ll only be the truly affluent who can afford these excessive fares. (Fine, maybe I’m being a ‘little’ hyperbolic.)

  3. See_Bee Avatar
    See_Bee

    I wonder how much the lack of recent pricing power has enabled the premium demand growth, and if “all boats (cabins) rise” through the current pricing cycle, how much does it “damage” premium demand?

    I’ll give an example: I bought seats in Comfort+ for my family on a recent trip based on our budget. If all fares rise ~20%, I may have to move the family back to coach again

    It’s probably not as dramatic as I’m making it seem and given that it appears that premium demand outstrips premium capacity nowadays, it could be a “good” consequence for airlines to ensure they maximize yield in premium cabins

  4. Tim Dunn Avatar
    Tim Dunn

    first. the refinery is part of DL’s vertical integration strategy that they implemented over a decade ago to contain the cost of jet fuel as a replacement for hedging. In the 2nd quarter, DL paid 25 cents/gallon less than UA for jet fuel, not only a reflection of the refinery benefit but also the higher cost of jet fuel on the west coast. We will see an even wider spread between AS and DL’s costs for jet fuel. UA tried to buy a refinery years ago but that deal fell through.

    second, Delta Tech Ops contributed over $300 million in high margin revenue for the quarter and is also part of DL’s vertical integration strategy.

    Amex is simply a richer credit card partner and DL has tied its position with Amex to DL’s larger corporate travel business along with its stronger position in NYC and LAX to generate a unit revenue premium not just to UA but also the industry.

    UA continues to fly 10% more ASMs than DL but can’t translate that larger size into greater profits. DL gets less revenue from passenger and cargo revenue than UA but a higher percentage from higher margin non-transportation businesses which have a greater impact on the bottom line.

    UA took a charge for labor contract settlement, presumably the final piece of the retro it has to pay its FAs and also got an earnings credit due to sale/leaseback transations; it increased debt via more sale/leaseback transactions and also took on debt to provide a cash cushion due to “geopolitical uncertainty”. UA took on more debt including to ensure it can pay for all of the massive number of aircraft it has on order esp. in the next few years.

    It is true that consolidation has helped strengthen pricing but it also comes down to who has benefitted from the failures of lower cost airlines. DL has benefitted the most from NK’s shutdown because of NK’s DTW operation, WN’s pulldown of ATL has benefitted DL, and B6 continues to pull down BOS and JFK to DL’s benefit.

    DL’s revenue premium is growing somewhat slower than UA and will likely grow slower than AA and WN but the transportation revenue premium is still supplemented by higher margin non-transportation sources.

    DL’s bottom line gap to other US airlines including UA continues to widen.

    1. Angry Bob Crandall Avatar
      Angry Bob Crandall

      TD,
      The refinery cuts both ways. Trainer is a single aging asset in a structurally declining East Coast refining market. It’s exposed to crack spread volatility, turnaround costs, and RIN compliance obligations. In quarters when crack spreads collapse, it’s a drag, not a hedge. It looks brilliant right now precisely because fuel is expensive, the same condition that makes everyone’s transport business worse. It’s a partial hedge, not a moat.

      AMEX concentration is a genuine risk. The remuneration stream is enormous and high-margin, but it ties a large share of Delta’s earnings quality to consumer credit health and to a single partner relationship. If affluent consumer spending rolls over in a recession, the loyalty economics and the premium cabin revenue weaken simultaneously -they’re correlated, not diversifying. Delta’s whole premium strategy is a bet on the top-third consumer; that’s been the right bet for a decade, but it’s still a concentrated one. Notably, premium ticket revenue of $6.92 billion edged out main cabin at $6.85 billion this quarter, great mix, but also a measure of how much rides on that customer.

      TechOps and the older-fleet strategy carry maintenance-cost and reliability tail risk that a younger fleet doesn’t, even if MRO third-party revenue is attractive.

      On United’s debt: worth being fair here that United’s balance sheet moves (sale-leasebacks, the cash cushion) are partly a choice to fund an aggressive fleet renewal that could pay off with lower unit costs and gauge advantages in the 2030s. It’s a different risk profile, more leverage and delivery risk now for a potentially better cost structure later rather than strictly a worse one.

      So I’d frame it this way: Delta has traded fuel-price risk and commodity-transportation risk for asset-specific risk (Trainer), partner-concentration risk (AMEX), and affluent-consumer-cycle risk. In the current environment, expensive fuel, strong premium demand, LCC failures – every one of those trades is paying off, which is why the fairest read of Q2 is that Delta remained substantially more profitable than United on the same revenue and the bottom-line gap keeps widening.

      The honest caveat is that the model hasn’t been stress-tested by a demand recession that hits premium travel and consumer credit at the same time. Lower risk than peers on the evidence we have? Yes. But it’s a different risk book, not a smaller one across all states of the world.

      1. Tim Dunn Avatar
        Tim Dunn

        Bob,
        Over the past 14 years, DL has turned the refinery into a breakeven asset during stable and low fuel costs and a huge profit advantage in periods of fuel price spikes. The decline in the number of refineries in the US is growing at a faster rate than the falloff in the decline in petroleum consumption. The crack spread on gasoline – let alone diesel and jet fuel – is elevated and is expected to remain so as long as the Middle East conflict remains because a significant amount of refinery production in the Middle East is effectively closed due to an inabiilty to export.

        UA’s fleet is still older than DL’s but the MRO makes money from other airline aircraft – and larger from DL’s exclusivity on new generation engines

        UA has maintained more cash than DL since covid while DL has access to more lines of credit. UA just took on more debt in order to increase their cash not only because of geopolitical uncertainty – higher fuel prices – but also because UA is having to increase debt including through leases because of their massive fleet deliveries.
        At the same time, UA’s fleet utilization is dropping as they hold onto older aircraft even as they take delivery of new aircraft at a faster rate than they can grow capacity.

        UA could have a future mainline aircraft CASM advantage but they continue to fly the lowest gauge regional jet fleet which elevates their overall fleet costs.

        Amex is simply a more affluent card and a richer cobrand partner, that has been proven over more than decade, and continues to be the case

        DL still gets a premium on transportation revenue so a scenario that DL will be hurt by a recession that hurts premium revenue and high consumer spending isn’t likely to change the balance. If anything, UA’s inability to diversify revenue to the extent DL has will hurt UA more- with faster growing debt including more new aircraft that are also chasing a premium strategy.

        and, as much as there is an incessant desire to compare DL and UA, the low cost and ultra low cost segment in the US is shrinking t the benefit of the big 4; AA and WN”s attempts to become more premium will help them at the expense of the non big 4 carriers.

        DL and UA happen to be further along the same path towards premiumization and globalization but DL is simply financially stronger.

      2. See_Bee Avatar
        See_Bee

        These are fair counter arguments, but I don’t think worth of the alarm bells you may or may not be portraying. In particular:

        -DL has operated a diverse, older fleet (than peers) for a long time – that isn’t something new to them. If anything, this becomes easier as they continue to simplify their fleet (MD88/90s are gone, 717s soon, older 767s go away eventually)

        -AA took the debt-heavy fleet renewal strategy to achieve lower unit costs, and it hasn’t worked well for them. I know UA is focusing more on premium revenue than AA but the interest payments AA is making right now take cash away from other investment opportunities

        1. Tim Dunn Avatar
          Tim Dunn

          first, as CF notes, UA has not uploaded their latest 10Q but, as of the latest annual report, DL’s mainline fleet age was 15.0 years while UA’s was 15.3 years.
          Fleet age matters far less than fuel and labor cost efficiency including regional jets operated under contract for major airlines.

          AA has a newer fleet but did a lot of its fleet renewal before the MAX and NEO became abundant and used 737-800s and 321CEOs so did not get the fuel efficiency gains.

          AA has the largest RJ fleet among US airlines and has more large RJs because of less strict pilot scope restrictions.
          UA has a large fleet of inefficient 50 seat RJs and continues to grow that fleet because it has the most restrictive pilot scope on large RJs. There are no new generation RJs operated among the US big 3. DL has a smaller regional jet fleet and uses a high percentage of them to fly point to point markets including LGA; many mainline aircraft have lower unit costs than even 76 seaters.

          and the use of widebodies differs between the big 3 esp. over the Pacific.

          DL’s maintenance costs on its fleet are lower because its MRO business subsidizes the costs of DL’s internal maintenance operations.

          Mainline fleet costs don’t materially change the profit difference between the big 3. Revenue generation in the core airline operation is comparable between DL and UA but DL subsidizes its core airline operation with better non-transportation revenue.
          and fuel costs do matter right now and explain a significant piece of DL’s profit advantage right now. DL’s stronger balance sheet – similar to WN – adds to DL’s profit advantage.

          none of this is alarm bells but it does explain the difference in bottom line profits which matters more than passenger revenue given that all of the big 4 are leaning more and more on loyalty and credit card revenue even before considerding cost differences.

          1. Andy Avatar
            Andy

            “DL’s maintenance costs on its fleet are lower because its MRO business subsidizes the costs of DL’s internal maintenance operations.” – that isn’t how MRO accounting works Tim, They report it as a revenue line, its not a cost offset. United also has a massive MRO business. Sure it isn’t as externalized as DL’s but to say their maintenance costs are lower because of that is just completely false.

            If Delta has all of these great cost advantages Tim, why did DL’s costs rise more than UAs in the quarter. United grew yield faster than Delta too. They expanded more capacity, signed a giant new labor contract and still grew costs less than Delta. Please explain your logic.

            1. Tim Dunn Avatar
              Tim Dunn

              Andy,
              DL gets a cost benefit from its MRO by doing work – at a profit – for other airlines that reduces the cost DL has to spend to maintain its own fleet. Given that DL has engine MRO rights on every new generation engine in its fleet from all 3 engine manufacturers- including the LEAP engines on the MAX10s which arrive next year, DL has a growing revenue pool given that it has US airline exclusivity to do work on other airlines’ engines.
              DL does spend less per seat mile on maintenance of its fleet, Andy.

              DL’s CASM-ex rose faster because DL just gave its non-contract employees yet another pay raise, Andy.

              DL used some of its fuel savings to increase pay for its employees.

              You can slice and dice it however you want but DL’s operating revenue for the 2nd quarter went up 19% compared to UA’s 16%, DL’s operating income went down 11% and its net income was down 25% YOY while UA’s op and net income were both down 17% with DL’s Net income of $1.6 billion almost twice as much as UA’s.

  5. Arubaman Avatar
    Arubaman

    Not trying to hijack the thread, BUT the Delta refinery fire will certainly impact their future earnings. I’m glad there were no fatalities, although I’m saddened to learn of injuries. That’s 190,000 barrels a DAY removed from Delta’s operation. I can only imagine how they are hustling to replace that fuel. Eventually, their stores will run out and they will be forced to pay spot prices. The good news is that they can afford it and they MUST maintain schedule integrity at all costs. I’d like to be a fly on the wall in their fuel procurement department.
    Evidently, the catalytic cracker caught fire on restart after maintenance. The catalytic cracker internal temperatures are extremely high and truly a major catastrophe was avoided. Fantastic work by the firefighting crew and refinery employees. It will be interesting to see how long it takes to get the refinery back on-line.

    1. Tim Dunn Avatar
      Tim Dunn

      DL is still guiding to a benefit from the refinery for the 3rd quarter but less than what they got in the 2nd quarter so they do expect it to be back online.

      AA and DL have long had a fuel cost per gallon advantage to UA because of higher west coast fuel prices and that is part of the 25 cent/gallon advantage that will exist regardless of the refinery. UA’s SFO TPAC operation uses a disproportionately larger share of fuel than other hubs and that is compounded because UA uses 777s while AA and DL’s TPAC operations are almost entirely B787s and A350s.

      The Jones Act was suspended to allow domestic crude to be supplied to Trainer using foreign ships which helps reduce the cost of crude to the refinery.

  6. Eric R Avatar
    Eric R

    The steady move toward more premium cabin configurations is also a factor. Take out 3 rows / 18 seats of coach and replace them with 2 rows / 8 premium seats.

    This was my concern once they started this wave adding more premium seats to airplanes. The war only intensified the situation.

  7. George Romey Avatar
    George Romey

    The ULCC experiment in the US has failed, at least at any kind of scale. Frontier Airlines is essentially trying to go more upscale as so did Spirit and failed miserably. They’ve got a tough road ahead of them.

    We won’t return to 1970s style air fares but the days of $49 fares even for Basic Economy with the hopes of making it up on ancillary fees are fading. Whether capacity can hold up long term is questionable. And of course the US4 drive profitability mainly through credit card revenue. Something unheard of 20 years ago.

    I find in many cases premium is very affordable. Recently I booked a one way CLT/DEN on AA. Main Cabin was $225, first was $425. $200 to go to first, a no brainer for me. Now there are millions out there that do not have $200 to spare. But many do. I would not count on a complimentary upgrade on that flight.

    1. Eric R Avatar
      Eric R

      That’s right. The airline just got you to almost double the price of your airfare because the premium space now exists.

      The price creep is real.

    2. 1990 Avatar
      1990

      George, if even as a Concierge Key, you felt like you needed to purchase that confirmed upgrade, outright. Isn’t that more telling about the weakened state of the ‘status’ and the lack of ‘complimentary upgrades’ than anything else?

      1. Bill from DC Avatar
        Bill from DC

        status is essentially meaningless and complimentary upgrades are essentially non-existent. the two are highly correlated.

        1. 1990 Avatar
          1990

          Sure seems that way. I’d only rely on actual guaranteed, finite benefits, like, when I was EP, I didn’t bother with SWU, because so rarely did they clear; likewise, United’s PlusPoints weren’t ‘doin-it’ for me, either. Delta’s GUCs usually confirmed in-advance, but RUCs have taken a hit lately (no more availability on Main-to-D1 for JFK-SFO, which used to be a sweet-spot). Status is overrated.

  8. DesertGhost Avatar
    DesertGhost

    I moved from Chicago to Phoenix in March of 1976 – that’s 50 years ago. I wanted to go back to visit my parents in Wisconsin for Christmas, so I booked a ticket on American (the only other non-stop choice between Phoenix and Chicago in those days was on TWA). I flew “night coach” – at a reduced fare for people young or crazy enough to travel overnight. The ticket cost me $110.00.

    Here’s the point: The cost of my $110.00 ticket – adjusted for inflation – is now almost $650.00 – for what amounts to the rough equivalent of “basic economy” nowadays. I did a quick, very unscientific, search for tickets between Phoenix and Chicago this morning, and the fares ranged from about $259.00 to $333.00. That’s about half of what my 1976 ticket cost me in terms of real purchasing power. Incidentally, the highest fare was on Southwest to Midway. This isn’t a true apples to apples comparison, as checked bags were included in the fare. But there were no meals offered.

    So – if consolidation was supposed to get rid of competition and cause fares to skyrocket – it has failed. I realize there’s competition between Phoenix and Chicago – but – in spite of all of the consolidation – there is still plenty of competition.

    As for product segmentation – I’m a fan. It gives consumers choice, and choice is usually a good thing. Why should I pay for the use of a lounge when I don’t want to use a lounge?

    1. 1990 Avatar
      1990

      “And you’ve been CEO of…” (I’ll stop. After all, that’s your go-to.) Your ‘back in my day’ sentiments amount to a pro-industry sane-wash of these inflated fares and new unbundling. I don’t think many consumers share your optimism, unless someone else is paying for it (OPM). That is cool that you still recall what you paid for a TWA redeye from 50 years ago. No meals is a shame. If they did serve them, I’d recommend… the lasagna.

  9. Exit Row Seat Avatar
    Exit Row Seat

    ALTERNATE THEORY:
    Currently the Big Three control approximately 58% of the US market. Yet, the Next Three are making moves which will pick at that premium revenue:

    – Southwest has developed its own definition of domestic 1st. Waiting for the day when they install a partition. Constant rumors of lounges; Approximately 18% of market
    – Alaska has moved past the Continental Divide with supplemental TALT (SEA) & TPAC (HNL) service. Already has lounges. Approximately 5.8%.
    – JetBlue has introduced Mini-Mint and captured top dog status at FLL with the demise of Spirit. Lounges are on the radar scope. Approximately 3.4%

    The Next Three are morphing into full fledge airlines with lounges, domestic 1st, and some international service. Yet, each will use the shadow airline approach as the Big Three do by not stepping on each other’s hubs (ORD excluded). Each are hawking credit cards and frequent flier programs like the Big Three. Two of the Next Three lack an airline alliance. Yet, once they join, they enhance their intrinsic value to PAX and the dynamics of the market change.
    Before TD jumps my arse, I’m not saying it’s gloom and doom for the Big Three. However, as we move further into the decade, they will need to work harder for that premium revenue as the Next Three tug at their high value PAX. This could come sooner than imagined if the Big Three continue their hubris attitude towards their respective frequently fliers.

  10. Mary Avatar
    Mary

    Are these corrected for add-ons, which used to be part of the fee?

    What’s important is what people are ACTUALLY PAYING for flying, not just what the airlines decide to call “fare”.

    You have to take into account the enshittification of air travel, otherwise the analysis is irrelevant as it’s wrong.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.