You know when you start poking around data and then 175 hours later you realize you may have just gone a bit too far? That’s where I found myself recently when I began to dive into the world of long-haul narrowbody flying. We all know that the 757 is reaching the end of its stellar run and that the A321neo/LR/XLR is stepping up to take its place. But I wanted to really look into the data to better understand just how this was happening. The end result is a whole bunch of animated gifs that tell the story.
Note: If you get this via email and can’t see the gifs, make sure to click on the title in the email to read on crankyflier.com. It’s worth it.
First, let’s start with a summary chart. I grouped narrowbodies into five groups:
- 757 – includes the 757-200 and 757-300 variants
- 737 NG – includes the 737-600/700/800/900 variants
- 737 MAX – includes the 737-8/9 MAX variants
- Airbus CEO – includes the A318/A319/A320/A321 current engine options
- Airbus NEO – includes the A320/A321 new engine options
Then I pulled Cirium data for flights over 3,000 miles over time, going back to 2005. You can see definite trends here.
Monthly Narrowbody Block Minutes on Flights > 3,000 miles by Fleet
Data by Cirium
So, what do we see? The 757 was the absolute king of the road up until the pandemic. It wasn’t until the Great Recession when the use of the 757 peaked on long flights, but it remained very important until the pandemic when retirements hit that aging fleet hard.
Meanwhile, the 737 NG was surprisingly the second largest player in long-haul flying, but it only grew up until the pandemic. That was going to end when the MAX came online, but as we all know, that was grounded. So the rise of the MAX didn’t happen until after the pandemic.
The A321neo’s LR version didn’t come until much later with the XLR just having its first delivery to Iberia completed. Despite the later start, it has become the one to beat, by far showing up as the best 757 replacement. Boeing has gone from nearly 100 percent of this market to closer to half. And more will be ceded without a different aircraft for Boeing to offer airlines.
That’s the overview, but it’s the nuance that’s far more interesting. I put together a summer story by fleet that I’ve put into animated gifs. Let’s start with the 757.
Data by Cirium, Maps generated by the Great Circle Mapper – copyright © Karl L. Swartz.
I have put notations on each image as you can tell, but let’s talk through it a bit here.
In 2005, the 757 was going Transatlantic on short hops, and it was heading from Europe toward Southeast Asia. But in 2006, North American Airways decided to experiment with US – West Africa flying. And in 2007, Northwest pushed further inland in the US, operating Detroit flights to Europe. By 2008, First Choice Airways in the UK decided to do a ton of flying to the Caribbean and Latin America, it appears. I find it hard to believe that this was even possible, but it’s what the data shows. Take it or leave it, but either way, it didn’t last long.
In 2013, much of the 757 long-haul flying was starting to wane except for Transatlantic, and Icelandair really began to go longer-haul to the western US. In 2016, American had mostly left South America with those airplanes while in 2017 United began isolating its fleet further west in Europe, making for shorter flights and fewer fuel stops.
When the pandemic hit, the 757 fleet nearly ground to a halt. Icelandair was the only one really keeping its fleet going. But in 2022, United brought its 757s back into regular rotation. Other than those two, the long-haul 757 has largely become a tool of necessity. Russian airline Azur Air, for example, has pressed it into service as new aircraft become harder and harder to procure in that country.
Let’s contrast this with the 737 NG and A320ceo family. (I’m aware that the label is wrong in calling it a NEO, but it was going to be a real pain to fix. Sorry.)
Data by Cirium, Maps generated by the Great Circle Mapper – copyright © Karl L. Swartz.
If we go back to 2005, this was a very niche operation. Air France did some long-haul Airbus flying into Africa while Lufthansa contracted with Privatair to fly mostly 737s but also Airbuses in an all-business class configuration. The only non-niche operation was Copa which was just starting to flex its muscles from that Panama City hub.
In 2010, British Airways started its vaunted business class-only A318 service from London/City to New York, but it was 2011 when others began to test how far those 737s could fly. Turkish and Royal Air Maroc took their first swings that year and began growing SilkAir followed in 2015.
In 2017, Norwegian decided to test the waters by using 737-800s on those East Coast – Europe flights. In 2018, WOW Air in Iceland used A321s to try something deeper into the US. But that was about it except for La Compagnie using business class A321s and Air Transat pushing A321s into service until it had the neo aircraft to fly the full schedule.
The Airbuses were always minor players or placeholders while the 737s had some flying that was sustainable. But as soon as those MAXes came into play, they disappeared from long-haul pretty quickly.
And that leads us to the new generation. Let’s start with the MAX.
Data by Cirium, Maps generated by the Great Circle Mapper – copyright © Karl L. Swartz.
This is a much shorter image sequence since the MAX didn’t go long until it was delivered to Norwegian in 2017 to better handle those East Coast – Europe flights. In 2018, Lion Air, SilkAir, WestJet, United, and Smartwings all joined the party, but then it all stopped. The MAX was grounded in 2019 and went dormant.
Things started moving again in 2021 when Copa started using MAXs to replace the NGs. Turkish and Fiji did the same in 2022. Icelandair opted for the MAXs on shorter-hauls but it still needs the A321LR to truly replace the 757. Those are coming soon.
Then we saw Royal Air Maroc, Virgin Australia, and flyDubai join the party in 2023 with Alaska, China Southern, and Oman Air in 2024. We don’t know what 2025 holds for us yet, but TUIfly will be a part of the growth story.
The thing is, most of these aircraft are replacing 737 NGs. Sure, the MAX can do some shorter 757 stage lengths, but it is primarily just a more efficient way to fly what the NGs did and stretch a little bit further.
That is not the case for Airbus’s new generation which is almost if not entirely on the larger A321neo/LR/XLR.
Data by Cirium, Maps generated by the Great Circle Mapper – copyright © Karl L. Swartz.
In 2019, the neo began flying for Air Transat and Azores Airlines with shorter stages. Even S7 in Russia had high hopes that are largely dashed now thanks to geopolitics.
In 2020, American and TAP Air Portugal started going longer with the former connecting Anchorage while the latter did shorter Atlantic flying. SAS and Aer Lingus followed TAP in 2022, and JetBlue started its own Atlantic enterprise that year.
In 2023, we saw Jetstar launch some interesting flying from Australia while Gulf Air did it from Bahrain in 2024. Next year with the XLR finally taking flight, growth will zoom. As of now, we have Iberia and IndiGo having filed schedules with their first forays into long-haul narrowbody flying.
The reality is that the only real replacement for the 757 at the edge of its range and beyond is the A321XLR. That’s why both American and United have orders coming. When United takes delivery of its first in 2026, it will presumably go toward replacing the 757 first. Once that happens, the 757 will begin its inevitable final approach after a stellar career. A Boeing replacement remains just an elusive dream.
45 comments on “The 757 Passes the Torch to Airbus as Boeing Watches”
There is nothing for Boeing to watch here other than having completely lost the market the 757 could support to Airbus, and that’s likely permanent. The 321XLR and 321LR are the new 757. Boeing will never be able to produce a new plane in time to catch up to this development. It will spend the next decade fixing its hubris, greed, and criminality + negligence,, from the c-suite to the factory floor, under the watch of the US Federal Government and as a ward of one of the big defense contractors who will ultimately take it over. Boeing’s best days are long behind it.
If Boeing builds a more efficient aircraft vs the XLR, it will recapture market share. Boeing opted not to build a 757 replacement since it could not generate the fuel efficiency/operating cost savings ro justify the clean sheet aircraft design. It has opted to invest it’s R&D in the 777X and stabilize it’s current manufacturing processes. In a decade, we will find out how much this has cost Boeing.
Well to be fair, Boeing is a defense contractor that just happens to produce passenger jets.
Yes, but their space division can’t be inspiring confidence with DOD right now, either
The amazing thing to me is that the A321 is even competent in this role; unlike the 757 it was not designed for it. The 757 wing has almost 50% more area and nearly 10% more span. It’ll carry about 10% more fuel than an XLR but not sacrifice cargo area to do it. It has 3 more meters of fuselage to fit crew rest and larger galleys needed for the longer flights. It’s a little faster.
To make max range the XLR must push to the very edge of its capability, sacrificing performance and revenue to do it. And yet it is hugely popular, a true testament to Airbus’ ability to get every drop of performance out of the design. I suppose whatever costs the 321 loses to design efficiency it probably made back in being much cheaper to design and bring to market than a clean sheet.
Interesting points on the 757/XLR comparison.
> I suppose whatever costs the 321 loses to design efficiency it probably made back in being much cheaper to design and bring to market than a clean sheet.
Hasn’t that always been the argument behind Boeing not producing a true 757 successor, that the efficiency savings just weren’t enough to justify the additional costs/headaches of a true clean sheet design? Perhaps a better question to ask would have been, “How can a newer aircraft be produced that has similar capabilities to the 757, while also having the right value mix (costs vs efficiencies) for airlines?”. As the 737 and 320 series continued to be stretched in range and payload over the years, it seems their latest evolutions have become somewhat reasonable answers to the question.
The 757 wasn’t originally marketed to be used on its current longest range routes. it was more a high capacity replacement for the 727, when short runway performance was more of a priority and efficiency less so. The 767 produced at the same time was meant more for longer flights.
I know that cargo airlines aren’t the focus of this blog, but how much life is left in those 757 airframes, in terms of permissible pressurization cycles (or other metrics that can’t be “fixed” by $$$$ C/D-checks)? Is it reasonable to assume that there will be a significant market in 757 pax-to-cargo conversions in the coming years, and that we’ll still see 757s hauling cargo through the mid/late 2030s, similar to how we still see DC-10s and MD-11s hauling cargo today?
Some 757 freighter conversions are underway so they definitely will be around for a bit longer in that regard. However, 757s remain popular in passenger service, a lot longer than the MD-11s which were mostly gone by the late 2000s, and both aircraft were built at similar times.
I’d expect there’s much less life left in them than there were for MD-11s when they were converted so there probably won’t be huge numbers of them (yes, operational life in years isn’t the same as cycles, but they are definitely correlated). Plus they are a smaller aircraft to begin with.
I see UPS and FedEx 757’s at my home airport all the time. FedEx used to fly MD-11’s (sometime a pair of them), but they’re strictly 757’s now. UPS uses A300’s or 767’s occasionally but otherwise it’s daily 757’s. The 757 seems to be the go to cargo plane for smaller metro areas.
I still find it very odd that Boeing never developed a suitable replacement for the 757. Someone fell asleep at the throttle.
Eric, there was a plan that would have lead to the replacement: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_Yellowstone_Project, but the last 20+ years of Boeing history happened.
One of the interesting side notes, I think, is that after the merger in 1997 Boeing inherited the MD-95/717 program and never could figure out what to do with it. I was an aerospace engineering student at the time in the LA area, and the folks I would talk with at Long Beach, said that the problem (from their perspective) was airlines were interested in the 717 but wanted Boeing to commit to the stretch 717-300 to go with the 717-200 so they could order both. The problem was the -300 would have been a direct competitor with the 737-700. So instead the Long Beach guys felt like the marketers in Seattle would bring airlines in and talk them into a switch from a potential 717 order into getting 737-700/800s. (Which probably made tactical sense for Boeing.) In the long run, it’s been a part of the problem at Boeing. One of the reasons that Airbus can optimize the NEO around the A321 size is that they now have the CSeries (A220) which would have been the direct competitor to the 717. A318/A319s are pretty much dead.
You can imagine an alternate history where Boeing builds the 717-300 and then ultimately re-engines the 717s with P&W GTF (since they don’t have the underwing clearance problem of the 737 family) to compete with with CSeries. It then keeps 757 in-production with a re-engine as a bridge to Y1, with 737Max never happening. But that history requires a board that is less focused on stock price and near term ROI. (Also airline customers like SWA didn’t help matters, because they wanted 737s everywhere for commonality)
…How can you say Airbus has “won” with the XLR?
…Sure, for example, United has ordered 50 XLR frames.
… Using your criteria, a range of 3,000 miles, all the MAX variants qualify.
… United has 513 frames + orders for MAX variants.
… The XLR will be a great plane, but a niche model.
… Carriers buy frames for a desired mission. Not the “maximum range”.
CJ – In the market for long-haul narrowbody flying, Airbus has gone from effectively zero presence to half. It’s definitely a victory for that market segment.
Some years back Olympic Airways (remember them?) used to schedule a B707-320 to the maximum of it’s range at the time. In order for them to fly ATH-YMX/YUL non-stop they used to plan an enroute stop in YQX or YHZ and then while enroute they would refile for YMX/YUL. None of this was known by the passengers, and I’m not aware of anytime they had to make the enroute stop. But the ability to re-plan while in the air was, at the time, a novel idea and they exploited it quite successfully.
So, going back to CF’s discussion above, is the concept of planning an enroute stop used on any of these long flights? I believe the FAA has prevented its further use, but I’m not sure about other authorities.
Perhaps one of your wise readers can comment…..?
Many thanks for a great blog!
Anonymous – I thought this was a regular thing. I seem to recall Alaska dispatching its 737-800s to Hilo, only to redispatch to the actual destination once they got closer. Is this not allowed anymore?
Its called ReDispatch and is quite common and used by US airlines and ones around the world for long haul flights.
It will be interesting to see how big the market actually is for > 3,500 nmi stage lengths in a jet that only carries ~206 passengers. I think there is reasonable skepticism about whether you can bring in enough revenue per passenger to cover the fairly substantial operational costs.
Selfishly, I’d love to have direct flights to Europe from my region’s mid-sized East Coast airport – maybe Aer Lingus? But commercially I’m not convinced that it would make sense.
The CASM/CASK is going to be lower in the A321 NEOs than widebodies. It’s going to happen, the same way widebodies lost out on transcons to A320CEOs & 737 NGs over the past 30 years.
It would be interesting to see a CASM (and CASM ex-fuel) comparison of (say) the 321XLR on various stage lengths compared to widebodies on the same stage lengths.
Beyond fuel, I’d be curious to know how significant of an impact the cost of additional crew (due to crew duty/rest rules as flights exceed certain parameters) is relative to the total costs of operating the flight. Obviously spreading out the cost of an additional pilot (and a few additional F/As) over 200 pax would have more of an impact than spreading the cost over 300+ pax, but the crews flying the larger planes typically make significantly more, so I’m not sure it would be quite that simple…
Not trying to argue with you at all, I’d just love to see the numbers on something like this. Fun things to think about.
on a CASM basis, the A321NEO in a comparable configuration to a widebody will be a higher cost aircraft.
The A321NEO will be a 150-160 seat aircraft with business class and premium economy and the number of seats will be about half of what an A330-900 or 787-9 can hold.
If the comparison is a 190 seat A321XLR, then the appropriate comparison is a nearly 400 seat widebody.
Labor costs are not proportionately lower relative to the number of seats and narrowbodies can’t carry the amount of cargo the widebody can carry.
The A321XLR (or LR) will be cost efficient in a high leisure configuration where less than 200 seats is enough for the market or where a carrier thinks a niche airplane can justify the higher unit costs; leisure markets by nature are more price sensitive including to connecting options.
Unlike the 757, the A321XLR will not have a small airport performance advantage.
Fantastic post. Thanks for the effort you put into it.
I always delight in boarding a narrowbody at L2. Alas, the A321 boards at L1.
I love boarding at L2, especially when you take a left afterwards!
Hi, its me, California. We don’t get 757s out here in the west.
It’s not uncommon for United and Delta to fly them in and out of LAX
And SFO, to JFK/ATL/EWR or sometimes other hubs.
Heck, I flew a UA 757 DEN-SFO (so, hub-hub) a couple weeks ago.
Last week, 2 of UA’s rotations between IAH and SFO were on 757-300s. Was booked on one, but then had the opportunity to get on an earlier flight (on a MAX, no less, haha).
We do. United flies them on some transcons (SFO to EWR/BOS/IAD and probably some LAX transcons) depending on the season and flight.
Your rabbit hole was incredibly productive Cranky. I love diving into that kind of data.
I’m wondering if you subliminaly are upset with Delta. The 757 is alive and well there.
They are even puting new seats in them. During warm months i book my monthy trips (PHL-PSP) to get on the ” Harley Davidson” of the sky on PHL-ATL or PHL-DTW then ATL/DTW to SLC-PSP on the sweet E-175
So with such a deep dive into 757’s whats up with omitting Delta’s 757? When on PHL-ATL 757 we always pull into a long group of gates with 757’s all lined up next to each other.
In the winter DL flys PHL-MSP-PSP (only 737’s) and in Minnie up in the larger clubs youre up high enough to see bunches of 757’s buzzing in and out of there. To wind this up…. can you please talk about 757 life in depth? I dont ask for much…:) Il even send you my brand new
“LAX socks” from dorkfest that are tiny. ( I wear 14’s) as a token of apriciation…..
Love “Big Chooch”
If you read carefully, you’ll notice that this article was about flights longer than 3,000 miles. Delta no longer flies the 757 that far. Today, for example, their longest 757 flights is ATL to UIO at 2,356 miles. Close (ish) to making the cutoff, but not quite.
TIL that Quito’s airport code is UIO.
The fact that an all-American plane has to be replaced by a piece of flaming garbage from the xxx is a national shame
O’Hare – Stop with the slurs or I will have to start deleting and potentially moderating your comments.
So a quote from The Simpsons is a slur?
I hate to scream but BOEING UPDATED THE WRONG AIRPLANE!
The 737 was already in its second iteration, the MAX being the third. The first 737 was delivered in 1967! The design is so outdated (too low to the ground) that it had to use software to push the nose down in order to utilize larger, modern, more fuel efficient engines. MCAS was a historic failure and caused the loss of two airframes and hundreds of lives.
The 757 was a clean sheet design dating to 1983. It has commonality with a wide body plane which is still unheard of outside of the 757/767 class. Even in its original form, it outperforms the newest 737 MAXs in many regards.
Do they really want us to believe that it was too cost prohibitive to re-engine just the 757s as per the Airbus 320 series CEO/neo model? Do they really expect us to believe that 737 and 757 modernization was an either or decision?
That decision may have been pennywise at the time it was made but it is now pound finish at they are starting to hemorrhage dollars in this segment and will continue to do so for at least the next decade without a 757 replacement or 321 LR/XLR competitor even existing on a whiteboard at this point.
Shameful, shocking negligence and ineptitude. And that’s not even considering the inherently flawed, physics-defying maneuvers required to tart up a 1967 era jalopy into the embarrassing Frankenplane they foisted onto the flying public known as the MAX.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_New_Midsize_Airplane
The Max is the fourth generation of the 737
100/200: Originals
300/400/500: Classics
600/700/800/900: NG
7/8/9: Max
You’re right! That makes this story even sadder.
Bill from DC, see above for my reply with respect to post-merger strategy and the MD-95, this is also part of the story. The other part I didn’t put above, is I also understood from folks that the 2001 Nisqually quake actually did significant damage to some of the buildings at the Renton plant and that getting rid of the 757 line was part of how they dealt with that (Boeing sold off some of the property at Renton and some of the older damaged buildings are now long gone). This required consolidation of manufacturing space, this was indeed a bit of an either/or in terms of how to allocate manufacturing space at Renton. The C-suite folks decided that going all in on 737 was more efficient than keeping diversity of assembly sites (Long Beach and Renton) and diversity of aircraft families (717,737,757). History suggests they made the wrong choice, even if it looked good for free cash flow and stock price in the 00s.
Given the plethora of problems at Boeing – in plane production and (lack of) new plane development, plus the Starliner (spaceship) fiasco, business schools should be studying Boeing as an example of a mismanaged company. They are failing, and their new CEO has a big job ahead.
I was just flying on an Alaska Airlines Max 9 and was thinking “wowzer, there’s almost as many passenger seats in this thing as a 757, yet we’re crammed in here..” and how the Max 10 will be the “new” 757 when it comes to passenger complaints.
The effects of the McD merger are why the 757/767 never got an update. And my god, it wouldn’t take much.
-> Lotsa new engines to hang on the wings without having to redo the entire wing & support structure
-> Update certain parts of the plane with composite/lighter weight structures
-> Update the landing gear
-> Rip out the cockpits and add the 777 configuration
There’s STILL hope – Boeing is continuing to build 767s and the Air Force refueler.
*bam* we get our glorious 767 back, and travelers can continue to b*tch about the 757 for another 30 years. :-D :-D :-D
The 757 and its sister model the 767 represent the period when Boeing was at its peak as an engineering company. Boeing saw the need to create commonality in response to Airbus’ philosophy but the 757 and 767 served different purposes and had levels of performance umatched by Airbus’products.
Most 757s were never used for long haul flights even though the 757 in its base versions was capable of transcon US plus flights. The A321 also will be used primarily on less than 6 hour flights; the success of the 757 and the A321 won’t be defined by how many longhaul flights it does.
The A321 became what it is because Airbus provided just enough more capability in the A320 family at lower weight than Boeing had left in the 737 family. But the A321 will never be what the 757 is in terms of performance – but again, much of that performance is not needed.
The success of the A321 will be related to how long it takes Airbus and Boeing to develop a small widebody as well as how long airlines use older widebodies – including the 767. New generation narrowbody longhaul flights are not proportionately less costly to operate than older widebodies. Some airlines configure their A321NEOs with only a couple dozen fewer seats than on small widebodies.
Don’t forget that the greater capabilities and the heavier weight of the 757-200 is offset by the 757-300 which doesn’t have the range but carries dozens of more passengers, making it more economical to operate per seat than widebodies.
It is a shame that Boeing didn’t push the engine manufacturers to develop a new generation engine for the 757. While the airframe is heavy, it is certain that there would have been many more orders for the a new generation powered 757 if it had been available.
United might shift its 757s to domestic use but they will hold onto them as long as they can be made to last based on Boeing delivery delays that won’t be resolved very quickly.
and I would bet that Delta will be flying 757s well into the 2030s since it has some of the last ones that were produced.
From what I have read, the Airbus A31XLR has only garnered about 550 orders. The A321NEO family overall has garnered around 6,700 orders. So the XLR has fewer than 10% of the orders for the family. If I remember correctly, there were a flurry of orders initially, but they’ve tapered off. All of this makes me question how big the “middle of the market” really is. As a member of an aircraft family, 550 orders probably helps the overall popularity of a particular model, but I have to wonder if the “middle of the market” is large enough to support a specialized aircraft.
I have always loved and still love the Atari Ferrari. I flew one for the first time on Northwest, MSP-LAX, in ~1987. It was pretty new, and I was amazed to have overhead TVs in the aisles. Over the almost 40 years since, it’s still my favorite narrow body. I am excited anytime I am on them, which, thanks to being a MSP based flier, happens frequently. Thanks Delta! I spent most of my 757 miles on UA birds, living in BOS from 2008-2012, and commuting to SFO for work. 5-6 hours on the westbound leg. Got used to it. Then UA started putting the 737 from Continental on those routes, ugh. The misery bird.
L2 boarding makes all the difference, why this isn’t standard on more 737/320 family airframes is mind boggling. My understanding is that the A321 is capable of it, but it’s a close fit in the jet bridge, so most airlines opt for L1. It feels like boarding a 757 through L2 takes about 1/2 the time of a 737-900.