Some feel blue as United, Continental wedding mixes old, new – Chicago Tribune
The Trib looks at the United/Continental branding efforts, and I chime in with why I’m not a fan of what I’ve seen so far.

American’s Express Seats: How Not to Introduce New Fees to Customers – BNET Headwinds
American has a new fee, and while it could be relatively straightforward, the way American released it was anything but.

US Airways Positions Itself as a Takeover Target with New York Moves – BNET Headwinds
The US Airways build-up in New York seems goofy, but it could actually be a smart play to get itself bought.

Passengers shocked by new touchy-feely TSA screening – Boston Herald
I didn’t even know that the TSA was tightening its screening process until I was contacted for this article. Sounds like a cheap way to get felt up to me.

Hmm. Alaska Air Group May Be Looking to Sell Horizon Air – BNET Headwinds
Horizon Air has changed its business model, and that has me wondering if Alaska is looking to sell.

Mammoth Mountain Lures United to Bring Bay Area Folks to Ski – BNET Headwinds
Another small town getting new air service. But this one makes more sense than many.

American Mechanics Shoot Down Tentative Agreement, Move Closer to Strike – BNET Headwinds
Unsurprisingly, American’s mechanics voted against the tentative agreement that had been presented. They’re moving toward a strike, but I doubt they’ll ever get there.

Yesterday on “Delays of Our Lives” . . . after a few rounds of going back and forth, it became clear that Kate Hanni has boiled down long onboard delays on simple overscheduling. I definitely disagree. Today we pick up where we left off. The next question in my mind was obvious . . .

Cranky: So it’s back to the overscheduling issue. If that’s the case, then why do a 3 hour rule instead of slot controls?
Kate: First, some people think 3 hours is too much. Let me give you an example. Imagine if we had sat 179 minutes in San Francisco before takeoff for New York. Imagine that we sat 179 minutes in the plane and then we took off and flew for 4 hours and then we diverted to Austin. Then we took off and spent 179 minutes on taxi-in in New York and we’re still under the rule guidelines. And the airlines will have broken no law.

Cranky: Come on, that’s an incredibly rare situation where something like that would happen.
Kate: No it’s not that rare. And here’s my argument about that. I said have it your way, it’s rare. If it’s rare it will have no impact. The airlines wouldn’t be fighting this if it were so rare. The data you see doesn’t show everything.

Cranky: What is it missing?
Kate: International flights are not included at all. Also, it only includes domestic airlines that have at least 1% of the air travel revenue in the country. I would say that 300% of flights that are sitting on the tarmac are not included in the data.

Cranky: How do you know that?
Kate: There are approximately 150 air carriers in the US and only 19 report.

Cranky: Yeah, but most of the airlines that fly into slot constrained airports report. Who cares if some small airline reports in some tiny town?
Kate: I’ll give you an example. Spirit Air doesn’t report because they’re just under the threshold but they’ve had long delays recently.

Cranky: Back to the 3 hour rule. Why is this better way to handle it than just putting slots at the airports?
Kate: It would have been better if the government stepped in and regulated congestion effectively but they didn’t. The Bush Administration didn’t want to do that, so this is the only thing that can be done since the airlines have refused voluntarily to reduce capacity.

Cranky: But airlines have agreed to voluntarily reduce capacity. United and American did it in O’Hare. There are caps in place at Newark . . .
Kate: It was a failure. When the DOT asked if some airlines would reduce their schedules, they did and then other airlines grew.

Cranky: Ok, so let’s say that we have scheduled everything perfectly to match capacity. But what about when bad weather comes in and reduces capacity? You can’t schedule for that and delays can happen. What do you do?
Kate: Those types of problems are caused by extreme weather, and the GAO says that 7% of airline delays are caused by extreme weather. . .

Cranky: That’s not true. Look at San Francisco, for example. You get some fog in there and they lose half their capacity. That’s not extreme weather.
Kate: We have very few complaints from San Francisco. I’m talking about extreme weather that causes delays over 3 hours. The airlines and their station manager and operations manager have a meeting several times a day as to what’s going to be coded as weather. Occasionally you’re going to have mechanical delays and weather delays, but they can code it however they want.

Cranky: But do we really need this? I mean, haven’t things changed since you were stuck in Austin? Haven’t the airlines made changes?
Kate: They haven’t changed anything. Nothing has changed except they’re fighting us tooth and nail. Just on the last trip I was going to do a report card in Washington DC. I called Delta to make sure my flight was going to be on time and they said that there was going to be a four hour delay but they hadn’t notified me. They said they didn’t have a crew. I asked how they knew they’d have a crew in four hours? The agent said, “We should probably tell you it’ll be indefiinitely.” I think they just told me because I’m a consumer advocate.

Cranky: I know that if I was on a flight that hit the 3 hour mark, I’d rather wait 20 minutes to take off then go back to the gate and not be able to fly for days because the flight canceled.
Kate: But would you want to be there for nine hours?

Cranky: No, but come on. That’s incredibly uncommon if it happens at all.
Kate: Nine hour delays happen a lot.

Cranky: I’d like to see those numbers.
Kate: I don’t have them with me, but I’ll be back at my computer in a couple hours and I’ll send them to you.

Cranky: Great, I look forward to seeing that. Thanks for talking with me.

She did send me her data in the form of her 2009 Airline Report Card (PDF), but it didn’t look as bad as she said. Though she mentioned that nine hour delays “happen a lot,” there were only 13 delays of over 5 hours at the top 35 airports for all of 2009. In addition, for all the reporting airlines, there were 904 delays of over 3 hours. That may sound like a lot, but that was out of 6,450,285 flights. Yes, it’s a very small number.

Some of the things she mentions show a lack of understanding of how the system works. For example, when I mentioned that San Francisco fog problems can cause delays, she said that she doesn’t get many complaints from there so that’s not the problem. Of course that’s the case. The delay is usually on inbound flights because of the visibility issues, and airplanes have to be held at their departure point if it’s bad enough. That can cause congestion at some of the other airports, and if there’s weather elsewhere, it can snowball.

She acts like the airlines haven’t done anything since she was stuck on a plane, but that couldn’t be further from the truth. Most airlines had some sort of policy before, but those have been strengthened with public policies and stronger chain-of-command to ensure it doesn’t happen. Is it perfect? Of course not. Airlines are incredibly complex and operate all over the world. It’s not possible to ensure that things never go wrong, but it is possible to keep working as hard as possible to reduce long delays from occurring.

Though Kate blames everything on airline scheduling practices, it’s the variability of operational capacity that makes things tougher. If the winds shift, your capacity can go down. If rain turns to ice, you have a mess on your hands. What this rule is going to do is encourage airlines to operate more conservatively to make sure they don’t face fines, and that will mean more cancellations.

It’s not like you can just magically open the door at 3 hours on the ground. Planes will now need to be called back starting around 2 hours to make sure that they can get out of line, taxi back and get doors open in time to avoid the fine. Once that door opens, the pilots are likely to time out. Without a crew, that flight is more likely to cancel and then people are stuck.

I continue to predict that we will see more cancellations and more unhappy passengers than we see today. If overscheduling really were the issue, this isn’t the way to handle it. That’s what slot controls are for, but they still will never be able to match demand with the ever-changing airport capacity during changing weather situations. It’s just the nature of the industry, and all airlines, airports, and air traffic control can do is keep working to try to make it run more smoothly. Blanket rules like this don’t help.

I wasn’t planning on revisiting regional airline safety again this quickly, but then I received an email in my inbox this weekend from Horizon Air CEO Jeff Pinneo. Horizon is a wholly-owned regional for Alaska Airlines. Jeff is a regular reader of the blog, and he felt compelled to weigh in on the topic of whether wholly-owned regionals are safer. I’m glad he did. Here’s what he had to say . . .

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Hi Brett,

My name is Jeff Pinneo–I’m the CEO at Horizon Air and a pretty frequent reader of your blog. My compliments to you on the good work you do ‘drilling down’ on many aspects of our business that your readers are interested in and want to know more about.

The subject of regional airline safety has certainly been one of those topics in the year following the tragic accident at Colgan, and I think you’ve done a really good job of helping folks take an objective look at the matter. Your post last week was a good example–in it you bring much needed perspective to the picture without minimizing the overriding importance of safety or of the need for the industry to do everything it can to further improve it’s already strong record. Regarding the question posed in the headline, I’m in general agreement with your conclusion–that being wholly owned by a major airline is not in itself a predictor of a higher level of safety. There are many independent regionals with excellent safety records and solid underlying programs. Having said that, I’ve observed our own evolution since the acquisition of Horizon by Alaska Air Group [AAG] in 1986 (I was at Alaska from 1981-1990 and have been at Horizon ever since), and I can attest to many positive influences and outcomes that have stemmed from our being wholly owned by AAG and a sister company to Alaska Airlines. It all starts with having one board of directors and one chairman (Bill Ayer) who are responsible for the whole enterprise and their obligations for ensuring a consistently safe and dependable experience across the brands. This structure, coupled with their strong personal conviction about the importance of safety, led both board and management to a ‘single standard of safety’ mindset and practices at Alaska and Horizon long before such things were legislated. As a result, both companies have moved virtually in parallel on safety programs from technology (e.g. introduction of heads-up-guidance system (HGS) low-vis technology in early ’90′s, Required Navigational Performance (RNP) and WAAS [Wide Area Augmentation System] program development, etc.) to audit and self-reporting programs such as ASAP [Aviation Safety Action Program), LOSA [Line Operations Safety Audit], FOQA [Flight Operational Quality Assurance] and IOSA [IATA Operational Safety Audit] certification. Our board formed a dedicated board safety committee a decade ago to focus on and reinforce the importance of all these safety improvements. It was the first committee of it’s kind and to this day one of the only, if not THE only, such committee of an airline board of directors.

As a further enhancement to safety oversight, the board in 2008 directed that an Alaska Air Group Vice President-Safety position–one that would be responsible for safety programs at both airlines and report directly to the AAG Chairman and the board safety committee–be established. Tom Nunn, most recently the CEO at Frontier’s Lynx subsidiary, was selected to fill that role late in 2008. Prior to that time, each company had individual safety programs and processes.

So while I agree that the ownership structure of a regional airline is not directly correlated to safety, I can say from our experience that we’ve been distinctly advantaged by our structure and relationship with Alaska Airlines over many years with respect to safety and many other matters. The fact is that many of the structural changes and investments in safety noted above emanated from having a common board and a single chairman who’ve been consistently committed to ensuring nothing less than the highest levels of safety at both operating companies, and to supporting their management teams efforts to that end.

I thought you’d be interested in this background as it relates to what is likely to be a matter of continued public interest in the months ahead. I’ve also attached a fact sheet on Horizon’s flight operations and safety programs that illustrates how our story differs substantially from the many broad-brush characterizations that have been applied–often inaccurately–to the regional airline sector. I’d be happy to discuss all of this in further detail if you wish–I can be reached at xxx-xxx-xxxx. Thanks for your time and interest in these matters.

Sincerely,

Jeff

Jeff Pinneo
President and CEO
Horizon Air

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Now, I agree with what Jeff says here, but of course, it could go both ways. Sure, if Alaska has a strong safety culture, that will certainly benefit the wholly-owned regional. But that doesn’t mean that an independent regional can’t have a strong safety culture, as Jeff notes. It also means, however, that a regional that is wholly owned by an airline with a poor safety culture would be negatively impacted.

As I wrote back to Jeff, 10 years ago, Alaska Airlines was found to have serious maintenance issues after the accident of Alaska 261 shined a light on the airline’s practices. That likely negatively impacted Horizon back then, just as they are benefiting from their enhanced attention to safety now.

In short, I think Jeff offers a great perspective from inside a regional, and I thank him for sharing it with me and all of you.

We started this conversation yesterday in the comment section, and I think it’s deserving of its own topic. The Colgan Air accident involved a couple of pilots who were exhausted. One had just flown in on a redeye the night before and shouldn’t have been flying that plane. Thanks to this incident, commuting and fatigue are getting their time in the spotlight, and it’s important that this gets discussed.

First, I’d like to make it clear that this is in no way a regional airline issue. Pilots at nearly every airline commute and fatigue is an issue regardless of what size plane you’re flying, though it is more taxing to fly 10 short hops a day than it is to fly one long haul flight over the ocean. Also, at the regional level, low wages can make commuting more of a necessity than a choice depending upon where that pilot is based.

People often think of commercial pilots as making hundreds of thousands of dollars a year, but the reality is that it takes a lot of suffering to get even close to that point. After getting a private pilots license, most pilots will scrap along, building hours any way they can with the hope that an airline will pick them up. Sometimes, that first job may be at some sketchy cargo airline hauling crap on ancient airplanes in the middle of the night. For others, that job will be for a regional airline.

That regional job pays just about nothing. A first year First Officer at Colgan, for example, will earn $21 an hour. And that’s $21 per hour of actual flying, not time on the clock. If that guy flies 75 hours a month (that’s the minimum Colgan guarantees), then he’ll make $18,900 a year. Yes, it’s incredibly low, but that changes over time in a growing industry.

When the industry is growing, the opportunity for advancement comes quickly. For example, if a pilot is able to get on with Southwest, the best paying passenger airline in the US, he’ll make $54 an hour in his first year as a First Officer, more than doubling his annual pay. A Southwest captain tops out at $206 an hour, close to $200,000 a year with minimum flying levels. But in a shrinking industry like we have today, people don’t move up very frequently. They get stuck in their jobs and don’t have the opportunity to advance. That’s why you hear a lot of grumbling these days when you didn’t hear it as much before. The unfortunate problem for the pilot, however, is that there’s always someone waiting to take that spot.

In this shrinking industry, pilots get paid less for longer, and that makes creating a good life for oneself harder to do, especially if that pilot is based in a big and expensive city. Allowing a pilot to commute to his job is the only way to be able to pay someone that little and expect him to live. That’s why you see people commuting from either cheaper cities or from parents’ homes. It saves precious money. These newbies usually find a bunch of other pilots and they all go in on a crash pad in their base – whenever someone is in town they can crash there. It’s not ideal, but it works. So, should this be stopped?

Not in my opinion. Listen to what Peggy Gilligan, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety for the FAA, had to say on the subject during Senate committee hearings on the Colgan Air accident in Buffalo.

As you can imagine, those pilots who commute responsibly are understandably concerned that they could be forced to relocate because of the irresponsible actions of a few. Should some sort of hard and fast commuting rule be imposed, it could result in families being separated, people being forced to sell homes at a loss, or even people being forced to violate child custody agreements. It is important to keep in mind these personal accounts because, to people not familiar with the airline industry, the issue of living in one city and working hundreds of miles away in another does not make sense. But in the airline industry, this is not only a common practice, it is one airline employees have come to rely on.

Very true. Do you think airlines are going to magically raise pay levels or pay for relocation? No way. And why should they? This process works just fine for those who are responsible. It’s those who take advantage of the system and show up exhausted after a long night of commuting that should be stopped. If a pilot can’t commute properly in order to show up rested for work, then maybe it’s not the right job for that person.

This is why the FAA is so important. The FAA needs to be vigilant in ensuring that airlines aren’t putting too much pressure on pilots to fly even if they aren’t up to it. There have certainly been times where that’s happened in the past, and I imagine it happens today. It’s a very hard thing to police for an airline. If management is too soft, then pilots may take advantage of the situation. If management is too hard, then safety becomes an issue.

This really is a job for the FAA, and it’s regulatory issues like these that should be their top priority. I’m eagerly waiting to see what they decide when it comes to rest and commuting rules, but hopefully they don’t give in to politics and simply ban commuting altogether.

[Original photo: http://www.flickr.com/photos/30816202@N02/ / CC BY 2.0]
[Original photo: http://www.flickr.com/photos/articnomad/ / CC BY-SA 2.0 - Joshua Davis - jdavis.info]

You might have heard about the guy with tuberculosis who was allowed to board a US Airways flight over the weekend despite being on a “Do Not Board” list. It’s yet another failure for our complicated security system, but how did we get there? I decided to dig in to see how the system works, and you won’t be happy.

In June 2007, a Do Not Board program was created for passengers with communicable diseases. It starts off when local and state (or foreign) health officials find out about a person with a highly contagious disease. They then notify the Center for Disease Control (CDC) about that person. The CDC is the keeper of the list along with the Department of Homeland Security, but for once, DHS is willing to let those who know how to handle these things take the lead. The CDC really populates the list.

This list isn’t just for anyone with the flu. It’s only for very serious diseases that can cause major health problems. In fact, only 88 people have been put on the list since it started. To get on the list, there are three criteria that must be met.

1. The person “likely is contagious with a communicable disease that would constitute a serious public health threat should the person be permitted to board a flight
2. The person “is unaware of or likely to be nonadherent with public health recommendations, including treatment”
3. The person “likely will attempt to board a commercial aircraft.”

In other words, if you get on this list, it’s a huge deal. So far all the cases have been people with pulmonary tuberculosis. What happens after the CDC decides that you’re worthy of being on the list? This handy diagram should help.

Right now, the TSA takes the list and then communicates it to the individual airlines to manage. As you can imagine, this means there’s a lot of lag time in the process and that’s a problem. Remember, to be on this list, the patient needs to be a threat to get on an airplane, so there is no time to lose. This past weekend, the CDC put this guy on the list on Friday. He flew on Saturday. With all those steps between being sick and the person getting on the plane, it’s not a surprise that the system didn’t react fast enough to keep him off the plane.

I reached out to the TSA to find out if the new SecureFlight program will handle this in the future. Theoretically, that would eliminate a step by taking the airlines out of the equation since the TSA would handle the matching process. I got in touch with a spokesperson at the TSA, but she didn’t know the answer and has yet to get back to me. So, it’s hard to know for sure if this process will improve or not.

Yet another failure of the system. *sigh*