Thanks for the very good summary on the premium airline situation in London. While I’m sure that AA’s entrance and subsequent exit hurt the little guys, I don’t think they would have survived even without AA ever entering. Fuel was ultimately what did them in. I mean, the cost of sending a 757 with 48 seats across the Atlantic skyrocketed with high fuel. Of course, it’s hard to say if they would have made it even with lower fuel prices.

Oh, and about Air Asia X. Besides the tremendous feed opportunity from the Air Asia network, they have one more thing going for them. Labor costs are nonexistent because wages are so low in that part of the world. That can help profitability a lot.

PJNelsen – Yep, Primaris was another one I left off the list. They were so small and only did charter. Their grand plans for flying passenger 787s in premium configurations never even got close to happening, and they ended up being just a lot more talk than anything. That’s why I left them off.

I know you say this isn’t a full list but a couple of other european airlines that failed this year are LTE (Spanish charter) Futura (Spanish charter) Futura Gael (Irish/Spanish parent charter) and Euromanx (Isle of Man regional).

The other thing I’d like to say is regarding EOS & SilverJet. EOS, based at Stansted airport in London was a top end carrier as you likely know working with its founder. It offered a first class service at business rates, but it, like MaxJet (more of a step above premium economy, but not quite business!?) not only had the problems of credit and fuel prices but also of American Airlines. AA decided to launch on the same JFK-STN routing, OK it offered economy class, but I strongly believe it was only servicing it’s pre-existing route authorities to kill both carriers. Job done it quit the airport. I do believe that there was a niche for both airlines, perhaps EOS moreso, but perhaps not from STN.

SilverJet had what EOS never had – it’s own terminal, which in some ways made it’s offering even more first class, even though it was positioned as below EOS but above MaxJet in it’s offering!! SilverJet appeared to have a fairly promising start, but like all things, it takes time, I think they had an awful lot of capital expense to start with, partly offset by use of Newark and Luton. But the arrival of AA down the road (with it’s Frequent Flyer program and route network) didn’t help it, nor the fact that MaxJet & EOS pipped it to the post in commencing ops. Of course neither then did the negativity surrounding MaxJet and EOS’s failures. The spotlight was on SilverJet and it doesn’t matter how good a company is, once the media and negativity takes hold, the bookings dry up and bang.

I’m not an expert, but an enthusiast, and I like the idea of the small guy’s having a go. I like competition too, but where it’s fair. Short term greed doesn’t work well either, I look at Stansted airport now, which has gone from 3 to 0 transatlantic services – once again. It will be interesting how Air Asia X fares – the main difference there is it’s pre-existing internal asian route networks making it attractive for connections… I think Richard Branson’s hand’s in there somewhere too.

Once again, thanks for a great summary – sorry to ramble!

L – I can’t believe I left KrasAir out. That was certainly one I should have mentioned. Thank you for adding to the list.

Skybus never achieved a 90% seat factor on a route in any one month. Strangely enough, the highest load factor was 86.5% on Columbus – Bellingham in August 2007. In 2008, no Columbus route ever went above 75%. Let’s look more closely at Florida, as you mentioned.

Columbus – Ft Lauderdale reached 83.3% in June 2007, its first full month of operation, but after that they doubled capacity and it settled in the high 60s to mid 70s.

Columbus – Punta Gorda didn’t start until December 2007, but it did reach 76.5% that month. It dropped for the next couple months until reporting stopped.

Columbus – St Augustine was different. It started in the 70s before peaking at 82.4% in November 2007 at which point they doubled capacity and seat factor plunged as low as 55% in February.

I have no doubt that they made some very bad route choices here (Milwaukee? ouch), and I also firmly believe that there are some routes that can support an operation like this. But I don’t see a successful outcome for an airline that’s based in Columbus and expects to build a large scale operation there.

My argument is precisely that there aren’t enough people in Columbus or visiting Columbus (no need to distinguish between the two, because they both fill planes) to profitably support much more air service than is already there. Now that fuel has come down, some more marginal flights may come back, but the economic downturn makes bolder moves highly questionable.

Might Delta bring back LAX to Columbus again? Sure, I could see that. But I don’t see much beyond a flight or two. In fact, I would expect to see a little shrinkage as Delta/Northwest rationalizes its network. Some of those Cincinnati and Memphis flights go easily go away, and that’s something we’ll see all over the US.

Happy New Year to you as well, and I hope that you’ll keep reading and contribute more. If you read, you’ll see that I’m not one of those people moaning about fees in general. In some cases and particularly for some airlines, I think they make a lot of sense.